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Introduction
“Marijuana isn’t meth. But drug-detection dog Talu can’t tell the difference.” 1
In the eyes of law enforcement, traffic stops and drug dogs go together like
Cheech and Chong.2 The reason is largely twofold.3 First, “routine” traffic stops
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Stephen M. Doyle, Chief United States Magistrate Judge of
the Middle District of Alabama; J.D., University of Arkansas School of Law, 2020. The author first
thanks Dean Brian Gallini for his invaluable mentorship and assistance in preparing this article.
The author next thanks Anna Van Der Like, Garrett Harlan, and Maggie Davis for their insightful
comments on previous drafts. Last but far from least, the author thanks his mother, Diane, and his
grandfather, Olen—to them, the author owes everything.
1

People v. Gadberry, 2019 CO 37, ¶ 1, 440 P.3d 449, 451 (Colo. 2019).

Cheech Marin and Tommy Chong are famous for their roles in marijuana-friendly movies,
including Up in Smoke and Still Smokin’. Thomas Regnier, “Civilizing” Drug Paraphernalia Policy:
Preserving Our Free Speech and Due Process Rights While Protecting Children, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. &
Pub. Pol’y 115, 149 (2011). They often portrayed two “blundering dopeheads who constantly
address each other as ‘man,’ are so stoned that they hardly know what they are doing, and
escape . . . even more inept” police officers. Id. at 150.
2

See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 829, 874 (2001) (“The war on crime uses traffic
3
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are a part of everyday life in the United States.4 In 2015 alone, over twenty-five
million United States residents experienced a police-initiated traffic stop as either
the driver or passenger of a vehicle.5 Second, law enforcement agencies nationwide
use routine traffic stops to fight the War on Drugs.6 Their weapon of choice: the
drug-detection dog.7
Consider an illustrative example 8: K-9 Officer William Wheetley is on patrol
with Aldo—a German Shepherd trained to detect marijuana, methamphetamine,
cocaine, and heroin—when he observes a truck driving with an expired license
plate. After initiating a traffic stop, he approaches the truck and notices that its
driver, Clayton Harris, is visibly nervous. He asks Harris for consent to search the
truck, but Harris refuses. Accordingly, Officer Wheetley retrieves Aldo from his
patrol vehicle. He walks Aldo around the truck, and Aldo alerts to the presence of
a controlled substance near the driver’s side door. Officer Wheetley then searches
the truck, but finds nothing of interest. He writes Harris a ticket for the traffic
violation and concludes the stop.
Far from uncommon, law enforcement’s use of drug-detection dogs during
routine traffic stops is a practice to which courts have widely approved.9 The
stops not to hand out tickets, or even jail sentences. In the war on crime, traffic stops are a
convenient opportunity to identify and eliminate threats.”); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”:
Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413, 1413 (2013) (noting that
“[o]ur streets and highways have become a police state where officers have virtually unchecked
discretion about which cars to stop for the myriad of traffic offenses contained in state statutes
and municipal ordinances”).
See, e.g., David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544, 545 (1997) (explaining that
the density of modern traffic codes ensures that “no driver can avoid violating some traffic law
during a short drive, even with the most careful attention”); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic
Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev.
1843, 1905 (2004) (noting that “millions of traffic stops [are] made annually”).
4

Elizabeth Davis et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Contacts
Between Police and the Public, 2015, at 4 tbl.3 (Caitlin Scoville & Jill Thomas eds., 2018), www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAE8-TZQD].
5

See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 4, at 1844 n.8 (providing examples of federal and state initiatives
designed to intercept drugs and arrest drug couriers traveling on the nation’s highways); Jordan Blair
Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672, 704
(2015) (explaining that “police authority and discretion in routine traffic stop settings . . . enable
police officers to detect and to deter nontraffic crime (for example, drugs and weapons offenses)”).
6

See LaFave, supra note 4, at 1894 (stating that “a good many of the officers making a traffic
stop either have a drug dog with them initially or else are able to summon one to the scene in short
order” and describing the use of a drug-detection dog as a common “tactic these days in police
efforts to use traffic stops as a means of drug interdiction”).
7

8

This paragraph is loosely based on the facts of Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240–41 (2013).

See generally Brian R. Gallini, Suspects, Cars & Police Dogs: A Complicated Relationship,
95 Wash. L. Rev. 1725, 1745–51 (2021) (illustrating the vast number of lower courts that approve
of law enforcement’s use of drug-detection dogs during routine traffic stops).
9
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United States Supreme Court has long characterized drug-detection dogs as a
unique type of investigative technique because they are incapable of disclosing
lawful activity.10 That is, a dog sniff is a binary type of investigative technique
because it reveals only the location of an illegal substance.11 The Court has
therefore held that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is not a
Fourth Amendment “search.”12
Scholars, however, have criticized the Court’s characterization of drugdetection dogs as a binary type of investigative technique.13 Many scholars have
argued that drug-detection dogs are simply unreliable.14 Other scholars have
contended that drug-detection dogs are inadequately trained.15 Others still have
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
10

11
See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the Central Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 881, 910 (2014) (explaining that a binary
investigative technique is one that discloses no more than “contraband or evidence of other illegal
activity”); Laurent Sacharoff, The Binary Search Doctrine, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 1139, 1141 (2014)
(characterizing the Supreme Court’s modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing dog
sniffs as “the ‘pure binary search doctrine’”); Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of
Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 411, 413 (2005)
(“The most widespread example of a binary search today is the use of drug-detection dogs that
alert only if they smell illegal substances.”).
12
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. To be clear, a routine traffic stop is a police-initiated encounter
based solely upon a traffic infraction, the scope of which is limited to the officer deciding “whether to
issue a traffic ticket” and conducting “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408).
A dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop refers to “a canine sniffing the air” surrounding
a vehicle, but “not touching or pawing” the vehicle. Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski,
Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 Neb. L.
Rev. 735, 736 n.2 (2007). For the balance of this article, unless specified otherwise, any reference to
a drug-detection dog or a dog sniff refers to one that is trained to reveal the location of marijuana.
13
See, e.g., Jorge G. Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S. - Mexico Border Region: A Review
of Current Fifth Circuit Law and a Call for Change, 5 Scholar 227, 241–42 (2003); Irus Braverman,
Passing the Sniff Test: Police Dogs as Surveillance Technology, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 81, 155 (2013); Brian
R. Dempsey, Canine Constables and the Fourth Amendment, Fed. Law., June 2013, at 40, 44; Aya
Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is that What Katz Is Made of?, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
781, 784 (2008).
14
See, e.g., Nina Paul & Will Trachman, Fidos and Fi-Don’ts: Why the Supreme Court
Should Have Found a Search in Illinois v. Caballes, 9 Boalt J. Crim. L. 1, 28 (2005); Cynthia
A. Sherwood et al., Even Dogs Can’t Smell the Difference: The Death of ‘Plain Smell,’ as Hemp is
Legalized, Tenn. B.J., Dec. 2019, at 14, 15; Monica Fazekas, Comment, Pawing Their Way to the
Supreme Court: The Evidence Required to Prove a Narcotic Detection Dog’s Reliability, 32 N. Ill. U.
L. Rev. 473, 504 (2012).
15
See, e.g., John J. Ensminger & L.E. Papet, Walking Search Warrants: Canine Forensics and
Police Culture after Florida v. Harris, 10 J. Animal & Nat. Res. L. 1, 17 (2014); Kit Kinports, The
Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 Nw. U.L. Rev. 64, 67 (2013); Leslie A. Lunney,
Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine
to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 Or. L. Rev. 829, 837 (2009); Jessica Na, Note, A Whiff of
Things to Come: The Unreasonableness of Dog Sniffs in Illinois v. Caballes, 39 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1471,
1480 (2006).
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maintained that police bias drives drug-detection dogs to give false alerts.16 But
the overwhelming majority of scholarship has overlooked an increasingly pervasive
infirmity plaguing the conclusion that drug-detection dogs are a binary type of
investigative technique17: Marijuana is legal for recreational or medicinal use in
thirty-seven states.18
Admittedly, one scholar has recognized that the legalization of marijuana
among a majority of states has undermined the conclusion that a dog sniff
presents a binary proposition.19 No article, however, has yet examined the
16
See, e.g., Taylor Phipps, Probable Cause on a Leash, 23 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 57, 75 (2014);
Leslie A. Shoebotham, Off the Fourth Amendment Leash?: Law Enforcement Incentives to Use Unreliable
Drug-Detection Dogs, 14 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 251, 269 (2012); Matthew Slaughter, Supreme Court’s
Treatment of Drug Detection Dogs Doesn’t Pass the Sniff Test, 19 New Crim. L. Rev. 279, 293 (2016).

See Christy R. Hiance, Note, No Longer Working Like A Dog: Cannabis and Canine Sniff
Jurisprudence Under the Binary Search Doctrine, 47 N. Ky. L. Rev. 49, 50 (2020). For further
discussion about No Longer Working, see infra note 19.
17

State Medical Marijuana Laws, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures (Nov. 10, 2020), www.
ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/GLW3-FMWK]. For
purposes of this article, only states that have “comprehensive medical marijuana programs” are
considered to have legalized marijuana for medicinal use; states that have “[l]ow THC programs”
are not considered to have legalized marijuana for medicinal use. Id. A state’s medical marijuana
program is “comprehensive” if it: (1) offers “[p]rotection from criminal penalties for using marijuana
for a medical purpose”; (2) provides “[a]ccess to marijuana through home cultivation, dispensaries
or some other system that is likely to be implemented”; (3) “allows a variety of strains or products,
including those with more than ‘low TCH’”; (4) “allows either smoking or vaporization of some kind
of marijuana products, plant material or extract”; and (5) “[i]s not a limited trial program,” e.g., one
“not open to the public.” Id. As of 2020, thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have approved “comprehensive” medical marijuana programs. Id.
Fifteen of those thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have also legalized marijuana
for recreational, “adult use.” Id. For simplicity, this article includes the District of Columbia as one
of the thirty-seven “states” that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. It does
not include Guam, Puerto Rico, or the United States Virgin Islands. For a full list of the thirty-seven
states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use, see infra notes 209–10.
18

19
See Hiance, supra note 17. Christy Hiance’s piece, No Longer Working Like A Dog:
Cannabis and Canine Sniff Jurisprudence Under the Binary Search Doctrine, persuasively argues
that “the binary search doctrine should no longer apply to dogs that have been trained to detect
cannabis” and that a sniff by such a dog “should necessitate the protection of Fourth Amendment
review . . . .” Id. The piece, however, omits the following significant Fourth Amendment
considerations in doing so.

First, it fails to recognize that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in possessing a
given item turns largely on where the item is located at the time of the alleged intrusion. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); cf. Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of a prison cell). In states that have legalized marijuana, the substance remains
categorically illegal in prisons and schools; an individual therefore has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in possessing marijuana in those locations. See infra notes 353–56 and accompanying text.
The result, then, is that a dog sniff conducted in a prison or school almost certainly remains a binary
proposition—even in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. See infra
notes 357–59 and accompanying text.
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doctrinal impact that legalized marijuana has on the Fourth Amendment
principles governing drug-detection dogs in the specific context of routine traffic
stops. Moreover, no article has considered the downstream impact that analysis
has on the law enforcement profession more broadly.
Accordingly, this article seeks to fill that gap in the scholarly literature by
making three arguments. First, in the context of routine traffic stops, it contends
that drug-detection dogs are a nonbinary type of investigative technique in the
thirty-seven states (and counting) that have legalized marijuana for recreational

Additionally, an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
abandoned property. United States v. Crumble, 878 F.3d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 2018) (“It is wellestablished that a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned
property.”); cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in “garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street . . . ”). Accordingly,
a dog sniff of an abandoned backpack containing marijuana triggers no Fourth Amendment
protection regardless of whether marijuana is legal in the state where the sniff occurs. See State v.
Hall, 2017 ND 124, ¶¶ 19–23, 894 N.W.2d 836, 845–46 (N.D. 2017) (explaining that, when
an individual voluntarily abandons property, the individual forfeits any reasonable expectation of
privacy in the property that he or she might have had). In the context of routine traffic stops,
however, the Supreme Court has made clear that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of his or her vehicle. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577
(1991) (holding that prior to conducting a Fourth Amendment “search” of a vehicle or its contents,
a police officer must have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other
evidence of a crime). For that reason, this article focuses on a thus far ignored facet of Fourth
Amendment doctrine: the relationship between dog sniffs and routine traffic stops.
Second, No Longer Working relies on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in People v.
McKnight for the proposition that a dog sniff triggers Fourth Amendment protection in states that
have legalized marijuana. See Hiance, supra note 17, at 69. But it ignores the competing approach
taken by the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Souza that a dog sniff remains a binary
type of investigative technique that triggers no Fourth Amendment protection in states that have
legalized marijuana. State v. Souza, No. 34154-2-III, 2017 WL 2955534, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App.
July 11, 2017). This article, to the contrary, compares those lower court approaches and analyzes
the constitutional shortcomings of each in arguing that a dog sniff conducted during a routine
traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search.”
Finally, No Longer Working suggests that “dogs trained to detect marijuana [should] not be
used . . . .” See Hiance, supra note 17, at 72. It overlooks, however, the practical realities of such
a suggestion and the resulting impact on the law enforcement profession. To provide the law
enforcement profession with a constitutional path forward, this article argues that law enforcement
agencies operating in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use must
retrain their drug-detection dogs to be incapable of revealing the location of marijuana or replace
their drug-detection dogs with those that are incapable of the same. In doing so, it examines the
threshold question of whether retraining a drug-detection dog is possible. Afterward, it demonstrates
that law enforcement agencies will encounter significant financial and administrative challenges
associated with retraining or replacing their drug-detection dogs. It therefore concludes by providing
law enforcement agencies with ways to mitigate those challenges.
In sum, although No Longer Working lays the groundwork necessary to conclude that a dog
sniff is a nonbinary type of investigative technique, it omits the constitutional and practical impact
that conclusion has on the judiciary and law enforcement profession in the specific context of
routine traffic stops. This article fills in those gaps in the scholarly literature.
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or medicinal use.20 Second, it asserts that a dog sniff conducted during a routine
traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search” in states that have legalized marijuana
for recreational or medicinal use.21 Third, it maintains that law enforcement
agencies operating in those states must retrain their drug-detection dogs to be
incapable of revealing the location of marijuana or replace their drug-detection
dogs with those that are incapable of the same.22 At its core, this article provides
the judiciary and law enforcement profession with a constitutional path forward.
Part I explores the United States Supreme Court precedent governing drugdetection dogs.23 First, it provides the constitutional doctrines defining what
amounts to a Fourth Amendment “search.”24 Second, it demonstrates how those
doctrines apply to dog sniffs conducted during routine traffic stops.25 Part II then
tells the fascinating story of marijuana’s history in the United States.26 It follows
marijuana’s journey from being legal nationwide, to being illegal nationwide, to
being legal in thirty-seven states for recreational or medicinal use.27 In doing so, it
summarizes a handful of those states’ laws.28
Part III closely reexamines the Fourth Amendment’s treatment of dog sniffs
conducted during routine traffic stops.29 To start, it demonstrates that lower
courts have begun to consider the constitutionality of dog sniffs conducted during
routine traffic stops in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or
medicinal use.30 Afterward, it makes two arguments.31 First, it contends that a dog
sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a nonbinary type of investigative
technique in the thirty-seven states that have legalized marijuana for recreational
or medicinal use.32 Second, it asserts that a dog sniff conducted during a routine
traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search” in those thirty-seven states.33
Finally, Part IV seeks to provide the law enforcement profession with
a constitutional path forward.34 First, it argues that law enforcement agencies
20

See infra Section III.B.

21

See infra Section III.B.

22

See infra Section IV.A.

23

See infra Part I.

24

See infra Section I.A.

25

See infra Section I.B.

26

See infra Part II.

27

See infra Part II.

28

See infra Part II.

29

See infra Part III.

30

See infra Section III.A.

31

See infra Section III.B.

32

See infra Section III.B.

33

See infra Section III.B.

34

See infra Part IV.
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operating in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use
must retrain their drug-detection dogs to be incapable of revealing the location
of marijuana or replace their drug-detection dogs with those that are incapable
of the same.35 Second, it illustrates several financial and administrative challenges
that law enforcement agencies will encounter as they retrain and replace their
drug-detection dogs.36 In doing so, it provides law enforcement agencies with
ways to mitigate those challenges.37

I. Dogs & the Fourth Amendment
Consisting of merely fifty-four words, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution reads straightforward enough:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.38
The United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
however, are anything but straightforward.39 To the contrary, “commentators
are remarkably unanimous: The Supreme Court cases construing the Fourth
Amendment are a mess . . . .”40

35

See infra Section IV.A.

36

See infra Section IV.B.

37

See infra Section IV.B.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment “proscrib[es] only governmental action;
it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official.’” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 –14 (1984) (quoting Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
38

39
See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468,
1468 (1985) (“The [F]ourth [A]mendment is the Supreme Court’s tarbaby: a mass of contradictions
and obscurities that has ensnared the ‘Brethren’ in such a way that every effort to extract themselves
only finds them more profoundly stuck.”); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 809 (2004)
(“With so many decided cases and so few agreed-upon principles at work, trying to understand the
Fourth Amendment is a bit like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle with several incorrect pieces:
no matter which way you try to assemble it, a few pieces won’t fit.”); William Shepard McAninch,
Unreasonable Expectations: The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment, 20 Stetson L. Rev. 435,
439–40 (1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court precedent defining a Fourth Amendment “search”
and the Court’s application of that precedent).

Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory:
Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1149, 1149 & n.1 (1998).
40
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This part seeks to provide, in straightforward fashion, the Supreme Court
precedent governing drug-detection dogs. Section A offers the constitutional
doctrines that define what amounts to a Fourth Amendment “search.”41 Section
B demonstrates how those doctrines apply to dog sniffs conducted during routine
traffic stops.42

A. Defining a Fourth Amendment “Search”
The United States Supreme Court has often explained that “the basic
purpose” of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”43 The Fourth
Amendment, the Court has reasoned, “must be construed in the light of what
was deemed an unreasonable search . . . when it was adopted” and “in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens.”44 To that end, the Court has established two doctrines for defining what
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.”45 This section provides the Supreme
Court precedent establishing those two doctrines.
Well into the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court relied on
the common law doctrine of trespass—i.e., the Constitutional Trespass Test—to
define a Fourth Amendment “search.”46 Consider, for example, the Court’s 1928

41

See infra Section I.A.

42

See infra Section I.B.

Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); accord Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
43

44
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); accord Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805 (1982); United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). An unreasonable, or unlawful, Fourth Amendment “search” is one
that is neither justified by a warrant nor a well-established exception to the warrant requirement.
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“The Fourth Amendment proscribes all
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted))).
45
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (explaining that the Court has used two
tests for determining what amounts to a Fourth Amendment “search”); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 400, 405–06 (2012) (noting that the Court has established a “property-based approach”
and a “reasonable expectation of privacy” approach to define what amounts to a Fourth Amendment
“search”) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).

See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (noting that “for most of our [nation’s] history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the
areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates”). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious
History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 67, 68 (2012) (concluding that the
Supreme Court did not use a “trespass test” to define a Fourth Amendment “search” until the
twenty-first century).
46
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decision of Olmstead v. United States.47 In Olmstead, federal agents suspected that
Roy Olmstead was involved in a conspiracy to distribute liquor in violation of
prohibition-era laws.48 The agents wiretapped Olmstead’s telephone lines without
trespassing onto his property and obtained evidence incriminating him in the
conspiracy.49 Based in part on that evidence, the government indicted Olmstead
for “unlawfully possessing, transporting, and importing intoxicating liquors” in
violation of federal law.50
Before trial, Olmstead moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that
the wiretaps amounted to an unlawful Fourth Amendment “search.”51 The district
court rejected Olmstead’s argument and denied his motion.52 The Ninth Circuit
later upheld the decision of the district court.53 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of Olmstead’s motion to suppress.54 The Court held
that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurs absent a physical trespass onto a
constitutionally protected area55—i.e., a person, house, paper, or effect.56 Because
the wiretaps did not physically trespass onto a constitutionally protected area, the
Court concluded that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurred.57
Although the Constitutional Trespass Test won the day in Olmstead, the
Court charted a new course four decades later in Katz v. United States.58 In
Katz, federal agents had reason to believe that Charles Katz was using a public
telephone booth to transmit illegal gambling information from Los Angeles to
Miami and Boston.59 The agents attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the exterior of the telephone booth where Katz made his calls.60 The

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
47

48

Id. at 455.

49

Id. at 455–56.

50

Id.

Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1927), aff ’d, Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.

55

Id.

56

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. For another early example of the Supreme Court using the
Constitutional Trespass Test to define what amounts to a Fourth Amendment “search,” see Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57

58

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

59

Id. at 348.

60

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2021

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 21 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1

10	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 21

device allowed the agents to overhear Katz enter the telephone booth, place a
call, and engage in illegal gambling activity.61 The government thereafter charged
Katz with “transmitting wagering information by telephone” in violation of
federal law.62
At trial, Katz moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the electronic
device, arguing that its use constituted an unlawful Fourth Amendment “search.”63
The district court rejected Katz’s argument and admitted the evidence.64 The
Ninth Circuit later affirmed the district court’s decision.65 The Ninth Circuit held
that the device’s use was not a Fourth Amendment “search” because it did not
physically intrude into any area occupied by Katz.66
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.67 Overturning the Olmstead
precedent, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when
governmental action violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.68
It reasoned that, because “the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not
simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches,” the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion cannot be dispositive as to whether the Fourth Amendment’s
protections apply.69 The Court therefore concluded that the agents’ use of the
electronic device constituted a Fourth Amendment “search” because Katz had a
reasonable expectation that his conversations within the telephone booth would
remain private.70
Concurring with the Katz majority, Justice Harlan wrote separately to clarify
“what level of protection” the Fourth Amendment provides individuals.71 He
reasoned that, for a person to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a given
area, the person must show that: (1) he or she “exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy” in the area; and (2) “the expectation [is] one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”72 In Justice Harlan’s view, the agents’
use of the device violated the Fourth Amendment because Katz expected his

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 348–49.

67

Id. at 359.

68

Id. at 353.

69

Id.

70

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

71

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

72

Id.
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conversations would remain private and that expectation was one that society
would find reasonable.73
In the decades following Katz, the Supreme Court coined Justice Harlan’s
two-step analysis as the “Katz Test” and consistently relied on it to define a
Fourth Amendment “search.”74 In 1971, for instance, the Court held that no
Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when a police informant records a suspect’s
conversation because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in what one
discloses to a third party.75 In 1979, the Court held that law enforcement’s use
of a pen register is not a Fourth Amendment “search” because no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in dialed telephone numbers.76 Seven years later,
the Court held that a police flyover of a home is not a Fourth Amendment
“search” because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in areas observable
from an airplane lawfully operating in the public airways.77 More examples
abound, but the point is this: After Katz, the Constitutional Trespass Test seemed
all but forgotten.78
That changed with the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision of United States v.
Jones.79 In Jones, federal agents suspected that Antoine Jones, the owner of a
night club in Washington D.C., was trafficking narcotics.80 The agents installed
a GPS tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and monitored the vehicle’s where-

73

Id.

See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that no Fourth
Amendment “search” occurs when police officers look through bags of trash left for collection
because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in garbage “exposed to the public”); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurs
when police officers walk through an open field because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists
in areas outside of the home and its curtilage). For a definition of curtilage, see infra note 140.
74

75

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). A “pen register” is a device that
discloses the numbers dialed from a telephone. Id. at 741. It does not disclose “any communication
between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, []or whether the call was . . .
completed . . . .” Id.
76

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). The Supreme Court has also held that a
police flyover of a home conducted in a helicopter is not a Fourth Amendment “search.” Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989).
77

78
See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (holding that no Fourth Amendment
“search” occurs when a police officer views a vehicle’s VIN number because no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in vehicle identification numbers behind transparent windshields);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurs
when police officers open a prisoner’s locker because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
the contents of a prison cell); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that no
Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when police officers track a vehicle’s movements on a highway
because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in one’s movements “on public thoroughfares”).
79

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).

80

Id. at 402.
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abouts for four weeks, during which time they obtained over 2,000 pages of
location data.81 Based in part on that data, the government charged Jones with
several drug-trafficking conspiracy offenses under federal law.82
Prior to trial, Jones moved to suppress the location data, arguing that the
installation of the GPS device on his vehicle qualified as an unlawful Fourth
Amendment “search.”83 The district court denied Jones’s motion, with the
exception of the data obtained while Jones’s vehicle was parked in a garage adjoining
his residence.84 On appeal, however, the District of Columbia Circuit suppressed
all of the location data, holding that the use of the GPS device constituted an
unlawful Fourth Amendment “search.”85
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
District of Columbia Circuit.86 The Court held that a physical trespass onto a
constitutionally protected area is a Fourth Amendment “search.”87 It reasoned
that the Katz Test “has been added to, not substituted for,” the Constitutional
Trespass Test.88 Accordingly, the Court explained that its “post-Katz cases” did not
foreclose the possibility that a physical trespass onto a constitutionally protected
area is a Fourth Amendment “search.”89 Thus, it concluded that the agents
conducted a Fourth Amendment “search” when they physically trespassed onto
Jones’s vehicle to install the device.90
To summarize, the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones makes clear that there
are two ways to define a Fourth Amendment “search.”91 First, under the Katz
test, a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when governmental action violates an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.92 Second, under the Constitutional
Trespass Test, a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs “when the Government
obtains information by physically trespassing onto a constitutionally protected

81

Id.

82

Id. at 403.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 404.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 408.

88

Id. at 409.

89

Id. at 408.

Id. at 410. To be clear, a vehicle is “an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth]
Amendment.” Id. at 404.
90

91
See id. (explaining that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to,
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”).
92

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
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area.”93 We next consider how these two doctrines apply to dog sniffs conducted
during routine traffic stops.94

B. The “Binary” Dog
For nearly four decades, the United States Supreme Court has considered
drug-detection dogs to be in a class to themselves among police investigative
techniques.95 This section explores the Supreme Court’s treatment of drugdetection dogs. Doing so illustrates how the Katz Test and Constitutional Trespass
Test apply to dog sniffs conducted during routine traffic stops.
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court first considered whether a dog sniff
is a Fourth Amendment “search” in United States v. Place.96 In Place, Raymond
Place flew from Miami to New York.97 When he deplaned, federal agents
approached and informed him that they suspected he was trafficking narcotics.98
The agents asked Place for consent to search his two bags, but Place refused.99
They then allowed Place to leave, but kept his bags for further investigation.100
Ninety minutes later, a drug-detection dog sniffed and positively alerted to one
of Place’s bags.101 The agents then received a warrant and searched Place’s bags,
inside of which they found over 1,000 grams of cocaine.102
Before trial, Place moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that the
ninety-minute detention of his bags constituted an unlawful Fourth Amendment
“seizure.”103 The district court denied the motion, and Place pleaded guilty.104 On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and suppressed
the cocaine, reasoning that the “prolonged seizure of Place’s baggage” amounted

93

Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3.

94

See infra Section I.B.

See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (characterizing drug-detection dogs
as a unique type of investigative technique because they disclose only the presence or absence of
unlawful activity); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (same); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (same).
95

96

Place, 462 U.S. at 696.

97

Id. at 698.

98

Id. at 698–99.

99

Id. at 699.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id.

Id. A Fourth Amendment “seizure” of property “occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
103

104

Place, 462 U.S. at 699–700.
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to an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.105 On writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision, holding that the ninetyminute detention of Place’s bags was an unlawful Fourth Amendment “seizure.”106
In passing, however, the Court also considered whether the dog sniff of
Place’s luggage was a Fourth Amendment “search.”107 Answering that question
in the negative, the Court held that a dog sniff of luggage located in a public
place is not a Fourth Amendment “search.”108 It reasoned that a dog sniff is a “sui
generis”—i.e., unique109—type of investigative technique because it is incapable
of disclosing lawful activity.110 Instead, the Court explained, a dog sniff “discloses
only the presence or absence of narcotics,” in which a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.111 Thus, the sniff of Place’s luggage was not a Fourth
Amendment “search.”112
In the two decades following Place, the Supreme Court did little to
clarify whether a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth
Amendment “search.”113 That changed in 2005, with the Court’s decision in
Illinois v. Caballes.114 In Caballes, Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped
Roy Caballes for speeding.115 During the stop, Craig Graham, “a member of the
Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team,” arrived at the scene with his drugdetection dog.116 The dog sniffed Caballes’s vehicle and alerted to the presence
of narcotics in the trunk.117 Officer Graham and Trooper Gillette then “searched
the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested [Caballes].”118 Ultimately, however, the
Supreme Court of Illinois suppressed the marijuana.119

105

Id. at 700.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 707.

108

Id.

Sui Generis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining sui generis as “[o]f its own
kind or class; unique or peculiar).
109

110

Place, 462 U.S. at 707.

111

Id. (emphasis added).

112

Id.

In 2000, however, the Court concluded in dicta that a dog sniff of a vehicle stopped at a
highway checkpoint is not a Fourth Amendment “search.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
113

114

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).

Id. at 406. Specifically, Trooper Gillette stopped Caballes “for going 71 miles an hour on
[interstate] I-80 . . . .” Id. at 414 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115

116

Id. at 406 (majority opinion).

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 407.
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On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision
of the Illinois Supreme Court.120 The Supreme Court held that “[a] dog sniff
conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop” is not a Fourth Amendment
“search” if it reveals only “the location of a substance that no individual has any
right to possess.”121 It reasoned that “governmental conduct that only reveals the
possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”122 For
those reasons, the Court concluded that the dog sniff of Caballes’s vehicle was not
a Fourth Amendment “search.”123
At this juncture, it is worth highlighting three commonalities between
Place and Caballes. First, both cases concluded that a dog sniff is not a Fourth
Amendment “search” under the Katz Test.124 Second, both cases reached
that conclusion by reasoning that a dog sniff is a binary type of investigative
technique,125 meaning that a dog sniff is incapable of detecting lawful activity.126
Third, both cases were decided before Jones and therefore left unanswered whether
the Constitutional Trespass Test applies to dog sniffs.127

120

Id. at 410.

121

Id. (emphasis added).

122

Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).

Id. at 410. Dissenting from the Caballes majority, Justice Souter criticized the majority’s
reliance on Place, arguing that “the infallible dog . . . is a creature of legal fiction.” Id. at 411 (Souter,
J., dissenting ). Citing authority demonstrating the unreliability of drug-detection dogs, he reasoned
that the “aura of uniqueness” surrounding dog sniffs had disappeared, along with “the basis” of the
Court’s reasoning in Place. Id. at 412–13.
123

124
See, e.g., id. at 410 (majority opinion) (“The legitimate expectation that information
about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s
hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.”); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (concluding that a dog sniff of luggage is not a Fourth
Amendment “search” because it violates no reasonable expectation of privacy).

Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (explaining that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop
is not a Fourth Amendment “search” because it “reveals no information other than the location of a
substance that no individual has any right to possess . . . .”); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (characterizing
a dog sniff as a unique form of investigative technique because it “discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item”).
125

See, e.g., Timothy C. MacDonnell, Florida v. Jardines: The Wolf at the Castle Door, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Liberty 1, 4–5 (2012) (defining a binary investigative technique as one “that reveal[s] only
the presence or absence of illegal items, such as drugs . . . .”); Jessica Alfano, Note, Interior-Vehicle
Sniffs: Reining in the Leash on Drug-Dog Sniffs and Searching for the “Search” that Courts Have Yet to
Find, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 519, 524 (2012) (“Binary searches can provide law enforcement with
a direct answer to whether an individual is presently engaged in illegal activity without invading
that individual’s privacy.”); Michael Bell, Note, Caballes, Place, and Economic Rin-Tin-Tincentives
the Effect of Canine Sniff Jurisprudence on the Demand for and Development of Search Technology,
72 Brook. L. Rev. 279, 296–97 (2006) (reasoning that “the Court’s canine sniff jurisprudence”
is founded on the notion that dog sniffs are a binary type of investigative technique, meaning one
that “reveal[s] only the presence or absence of illegal activity”).
126

127

See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405 (decided in 2005); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (decided in 1983).
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In 2013, the Supreme Court answered that question in Florida v. Jardines.128
In Jardines, the Miami-Dade Police Department received a tip that Joelis Jardines
was growing marijuana in his home.129 Detective Douglas Bartelt and his drugdetection dog went to Jardines’s home to investigate and, upon their arrival,
walked onto Jardines’s front porch.130 At that time, the drug-detection dog sniffed
Jardines’s front door and alerted to the presence of narcotics.131 Based on that
alert, Miami-Dade police officers received a warrant to search Jardines’s home,
inside of which they found marijuana plants.132
Before trial, “Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants” on the
grounds that the dog sniff of his front door was an unlawful Fourth Amendment
“search.”133 The trial court granted Jardines’s motion, but the Florida Third
Circuit of Appeal reversed.134 On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida
Supreme Court reinstated “the trial court’s decision to suppress” the marijuana
plants.135 Florida’s highest court reasoned “that the use of the trained narcotics dog
to investigate Jardines’[s] home” was an unlawful Fourth Amendment “search”
and therefore the warrant obtained as a result of that investigation was invalid.136
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court.137 Departing from Place and Caballes, the Court held that a dog
sniff conducted while physically trespassing onto a constitutionally protected area
is a Fourth Amendment “search.”138 It reiterated that the Katz Test “has been added
to, not substituted for,” the Constitutional Trespass Test.139 It therefore concluded
that the sniff of Jardines’s front door was a Fourth Amendment “search” because
it occurred while physically trespassing on the curtilage of Jardines’s home.140
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013). During the interim between Caballes and Jardines,
the Supreme Court held that a positive alert by a well-trained drug-detection dog provides law
enforcement with probable cause to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search” of a vehicle during a
routine traffic stop. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013). For a definition of probable
cause to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search,” see infra note 301.
128

129

Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3.

130

Id. at 3–4.

131

Id. at 4.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 4 –5.

134

Id. at 5.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id. at 12.

138

Id. at 5.

139

Id. at 11.

Id. Curtilage is defined as “the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the
home’” and is considered “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” Id. at 6
(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
140
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To be clear, Jardines is a greater restriction on law enforcement’s use of
drug-detection dogs on paper than in practice.141 Jardines creates a bright-line rule
that a dog sniff conducted while physically trespassing onto a constitutionally
protected area is a Fourth Amendment “search.”142 But Jardines does nothing to
limit law enforcement’s use of dog sniffs conducted during routine traffic stops;
those sniffs remain governed by the Katz Test, as applied in Place and Caballes.143
Thus, even after Jardines,144 a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop
is not a Fourth Amendment “search” because it discloses only the presence or
absence of an illegal substance.145 Or does it?

II. Marijuana’s Legality: A Tumultuous History
Marijuana has had its highs and lows in the United States.146 During the
last two centuries, marijuana has gone from being legal nationwide, to being
prohibited nationwide, to being legal in thirty-seven states for recreational
or medicinal use.147 This part provides the fascinating history of marijuana’s
fluctuating legal status in the United States. In doing so, it illustrates the modern

141
See, e.g., George M. Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses
to Reconcile Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing on Physical Trespass,
47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 451, 470–71 (2014) (explaining that Jardines does not limit canine sniffs
conducted outside of a constitutionally protected area and that those sniffs remain governed by
Place and Caballes); Carrie Leonetti, Motive and Suspicion: Florida v. Jardines and the Constitutional
Right to Protection from Suspicionless Dragnet Investigations, 14 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 247, 254
(2016) (reasoning that central to the Court’s holding in Jardines was the fact that the drug-detection
dog physically intruded onto a constitutionally protected area to conduct its sniff ); Kyle Nelson,
Comment, Florida v. Jardines: A Shortsighted View of the Fourth Amendment, 49 Gonz. L. Rev.
415, 422–23 (2014) (commenting that Jardines only limits dog sniffs that physically intrude onto a
constitutionally protected area).
142

Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5.

143

See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.

Since Jardines, the Supreme Court has decided few cases relating to dog sniffs conducted
during routine traffic stops. Most notably, in 2015, the Court held that police officers may not
extend an otherwise completed routine traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff, absent reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity unrelated to the underlying traffic offense is afoot. Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 357 (2015).
144

145

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (emphasis added).

Compare 2019 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel, Pew Rsch. Ctr. 1
(2019), www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FT_19.11.08_Marijuana_ToplineFor-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPW6-RWRZ] (illustrating that, fifty years ago, only twelve
percent of United States residents favored legalizing marijuana), with Andrew Daniller, Two-Thirds
of Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Nov. 14, 2019), www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/AEA2TANR] (noting that, in 2020, ninety-one percent of United States residents favored legalizing
marijuana for recreational or medicinal use).
146

See generally Joëlle Anne Moreno, Half-Baked: The Science and Politics of Legal Pot,
123 Penn St. L. Rev. 401, 416–20 (2019) (providing a history of marijuana’s legal status in the
United States).
147
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movement among thirty-seven states to legalize marijuana for recreational or
medicinal use. It also summarizes a few of those states’ laws.
For the better part of the last two hundred years, marijuana was legal
for medicinal use in the United States.148 Physicians recognized the health
benefits of using marijuana during the early nineteenth century.149 They
routinely prescribed marijuana to treat a myriad of afflictions including
tonsillitis, tetanus, typhus, rabies, dysentery, alcoholism, opiate addiction, and
insanity.150 In 1850, the federal government even placed marijuana “in the highly
selective United States Pharmacopoeia drug reference manual,”151 the Nation’s
“official list of recognized” pharmaceuticals.152
Recreational marijuana usage was also common during the nineteenth
century.153 At the 1876 World’s Fair in Philadelphia, for example, the Sultan of
Turkey set up a tent in which attendees could smoke “marijuana and its derivative
hashish” out of water pipes commonly known as hookahs.154 The Sultan’s tent was
a popular attraction and, reportedly, “the first place visited” by many fairgoers.155
Simply put, there was “no social stigma” attached to the use of recreational or
medicinal marijuana in the United States during the nineteenth century.156
But that began to change with the turn of the twentieth century.157 The
early 1900s saw a rise in social reform movements seeking to eliminate “the evils
believed to be inherent in substances such as alcohol, opium, and marijuana.”158
Prohibition advocates dubbed marijuana as a “killer weed that would infect

148
See Zachary Ford, Comment, Reefer Madness: The Constitutional Consequence of the
Federal Government’s Inconsistent Marijuana Policy, 6 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 671, 674 (2019) (“Before
the twentieth century, a variety of industries utilized marijuana to treat medical ailments and
create products from marijuana’s hemp.” (footnotes omitted)).
149
Matthew Segal, Overdue Process: Why Denial of Physician-Prescribed Marijuana to Terminally
Ill Patients Violates the United States Constitution, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 235, 239 (1998).
150
Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Role of States in Shaping the Legal Debate on Medical Marijuana,
42 Hamline L. Rev. 697, 704 (2016).
151
Ronald Timothy Fletcher, Note, The Medical Necessity Defense and De Minimis Protection
for Patients Who Would Benefit from Using Marijuana for Medical Purposes: A Proposal to Establish
Comprehensive Protection Under Federal Drug Laws, 37 Val. U. L. Rev. 983, 988 (2003).
152
Gregg A. Bilz, Comment, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine, 13
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 117, 118 (1992).
153

Fletcher, supra note 151, at 987.

154

Id.

155

E. Reid Ross, Cannabis: The Canadian Weed Reader 219 (2017).

Helia Garrido Hull, Lost in the Weeds of Pot Law: The Role of Legal Ethics in the Movement
to Legalize Marijuana, 119 Penn St. L. Rev. 333, 337 (2014).
156

157

Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 705.

158

Hull, supra note 156.
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American youth, provoking them to crime and violence.”159 They claimed
that marijuana caused insanity and “pushed people toward horrendous acts of
criminality.”160 By 1936, forty-eight states had enacted laws restricting the sale
and possession of marijuana.161
In turn, Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 (yes, they spelled
marijuana with an “h”).162 The Marihuana Tax Act required all buyers, sellers,
growers, and importers to purchase a tax stamp in order to legally possess marijuana,
effectively creating a de facto prohibition of the substance nationwide.163 As
regulations increased, prohibition advocates increased their efforts to vilify the
substance.164 One publication warned: “[N]ever let anyone persuade you to
smoke even one marijuana cigarette. It is pure poison.”165 In 1942, the federal
government removed marijuana from the United States Pharmacopeia.166 By 1969,
only twelve percent of United States residents supported legalizing marijuana.167
That same year, the United States Supreme Court held that several provisions
of the Marihuana Tax Act were unconstitutional under the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.168 Accordingly, in 1970, Congress replaced
the Marihuana Tax Act with the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).169 The
CSA created a system of classifying all controlled substances into one of five
schedules “based on the medicinal value, harmfulness, and potential for abuse”
of the particular substance.170 Schedule I substances are those that have a high
potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States, and a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substances
under medical supervision.171 The CSA classified marijuana as a Schedule I
controlled substance.172
159

Bilz, supra note 152, at 119.

160

Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 706 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

161

Id.

162

Id. at 706–07.

163

Hull, supra at 156.

Tim Weber, Note, Would Government Prohibition of Marijuana Pass Strict Scrutiny?, 46 Ind.
L. Rev. 529, 543 (2013).
164

165

Id.

166

Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 706.

167

2019 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel, supra note 146.

Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 53–54 (1969). See generally Joseph A. Goldstein, Taxing
Legalized Marijuana: How Courts Should Treat Drug Tax Statutes in Light of the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause and Executive Non-Enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act, 37
Cardozo L. Rev. 793, 797–98 (2015) (providing a history of the Marihuana Tax Act).
168

169

Hull, supra note 156, at 138.

170

Id.

171

21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).

172

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2021

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 21 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1

20	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 21

Despite the CSA, the general public’s opinion of marijuana began to
change—again.173 The same year Congress enacted the CSA, legalization advo
cates founded the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
“to give a voice to those Americans who opposed marijuana prohibition.”174
Throughout the 1970s, that organization “led successful efforts to decriminalize
minor marijuana offenses in eleven states and greatly reduce penalties in others.”175
It also fought, unsuccessfully, to reclassify marijuana as a Schedule V substance
under the CSA.176 By 1979, twenty-five percent of United States residents
supported legalizing marijuana.177 That percentage, however, remained consistent
throughout the 1980s.178
But the movement to (re)legalize marijuana rekindled in the 1990s.179 In
1996, California enacted Proposition 215, becoming the first state in the country
to legalize marijuana for medicinal use.180 Proposition 215 made it legal for a
seriously ill “patient or a patient’s caregiver, upon the recommendation or approval
of a physician, [to] possess or cultivate marijuana” for medicinal use.181 In 1998,
Alaska, Oregon, and Washington enacted medical marijuana legislation similar
to Proposition 215182—despite former Presidents Ford, Carter, and H.W. Bush
urging voters to reject marijuana legalization.183 Maine, in turn, became the fifth
state to legalize medicinal marijuana the following year.184
Soon after, tension grew between the federal government’s prohibition of
marijuana and the state laws legalizing the substance for medicinal use.185 The
short of it is that Article Six, Section Two of the United States Constitution—
173

Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 710.

174

Id.

175

Id.

Id. at 710 –11. Schedule V substances are those that: (A) have “a low potential for abuse
relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV”; (B) have “a currently accepted medical use
in treatment in the United States”; and (C) “lead to limited physical dependence or psychological
dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(5).
176

177

2019 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel, supra note 146.

178

Id.

See Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 728 (explaining that between 1991 and 2008 the
percentage of United States residents who supported legalizing marijuana rose from twenty-two
percent to forty-three percent).
179

180

Id. at 749.

181

Id. at 744–45.

A Historical Timeline: The History of Marijuana as Medicine from 2900 B.C. to Present,
ProCon.org (Dec. 4, 2020), www.medicalmarijuana.procon.org/historical-timeline/ [https://
perma.cc/2PR6-XBKJ].
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183

Id.

184

Id.
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Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 738.
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known as the Supremacy Clause186—prohibits states from enacting laws that
“interfere with the operation of the laws enacted by the federal government.”187
This created conflict between the federal and state governments because the
federal government retained the power to prosecute individuals who lawfully
possess, distribute, or prescribe medical marijuana under state law.188
And during the early twenty-first century, the federal government chose to
exercise that power.189 The George W. Bush Administration, for example, “raided
hundreds of medical marijuana dispensaries and threatened to derail the careers
of physicians who recommended marijuana to their patients.”190 Undeterred by
the federal government’s response, eight additional states — Colorado, Hawaii,
Montana, Rhode Island, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, and Vermont—
legalized medicinal marijuana between 2000 and 2008.191
In 2009, the Obama Administration decided to take a different approach.192
In October 2009, United States Deputy Attorney General David Ogden sent a
memorandum to federal prosecutors, encouraging them to refrain from prosecuting
individuals who act “in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state
laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”193 Deputy Attorney General
Ogden, however, made clear that marijuana remained illegal under the CSA and
that the memorandum’s purpose was simply to guide prosecutors in exercising
their “prosecutorial discretion.”194 That year, forty-four percent of United States
residents supported legalizing marijuana.195
Facing less federal backlash, the movement to (re)legalize marijuana boomed
in the 2010s.196 Between 2010 and 2012, Arizona, Delaware, Connecticut,
186

U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.

187

Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 738.

188

Id. at 739.

See Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to
Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 633, 638 (2011) (noting that during the George W.
Bush Administration the Drug Enforcement Administration “conducted nearly two hundred raids
on medical marijuana dispensaries in California alone, and it warned landlords that it would seize
their property if they did not immediately evict marijuana-dispensing tenants” (footnote omitted)).
189

190
Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 738. The Clinton Administration likewise “campaigned
forcefully” against state medical marijuana programs. Id.
191

A Historical Timeline, supra note 182.

192

Shu-Acquaye, supra note 150, at 739.

David W. Ogden, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum for Selected United States
Attorneys 1–2 (2009), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medicalmarijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7HB-MSUN].
193

194

Id. at 2–3.

195

2019 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel, supra note 146.

See id. (illustrating that between 2009 and 2019 the percentage of United States
residents who supported legalizing marijuana for recreational use rose from forty-four percent to
sixty-seven percent).
196
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the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Massachusetts legalized medicinal
marijuana.197 In 2012, Colorado and Washington, deciding to take things a step
further, became the first two states to legalize marijuana for recreational use.198
Colorado’s Amendment 64, for example, legalized the recreational purchase
and possession of up to one ounce of marijuana for individuals twenty-one years
of age and older.199 It did not, however, legalize using marijuana in public, selling
marijuana without a license, or purchasing marijuana from an unlicensed party.200
Similarly, Washington’s Initiative 502 legalized recreational marijuana possession
and use by individuals twenty-one years of age and older, and outlawed certain
marijuana-related activities.201
Shortly after Colorado and Washington legalized recreational marijuana, the
Obama Administration sent federal prosecutors another memorandum.202 United
States Deputy Attorney General James Cole advised prosecutors to refrain from
prosecuting individuals who cultivate, distribute, sell, or possess recreational
marijuana in compliance with state laws legalizing those activities.203 He reiterated
that marijuana remained illegal under the CSA and that the memorandum’s
purpose was simply to encourage “prosecutorial discretion.”204 In 2012, fortyeight percent of United States residents supported legalizing marijuana.205
Today, the movement to (re)legalize marijuana is at an all-time high.206
In November 2019, an overwhelming ninety-one percent of United States
residents supported legalizing marijuana for recreational or medicinal use.207 Only

197

A Historical Timeline, supra note 182.

Maia Szalavitz, Two U.S. States Become First to Legalize Marijuana, Time (Nov. 7, 2012),
www.healthland.time.com/2012/11/07/two-u-s-states-become-first-to-legalize-marijuana/ [https://
perma.cc/6JCC-JTQX].
198

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16. See generally Laura Graham, Legalizing Marijuana in
the Shadows of International Law: The Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington Models, 33 Wis. Int’l
L.J. 140, 151 (2015) (providing a detailed overview of Amendment 64 and Colorado’s marijuana industry).
199

200

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16; Graham, supra note 199.

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.4013 (2020). See generally Nathaniel Counts, Initiative
502 and Conflicting State and Federal Law, 49 Gonz. L. Rev. 187, 189–92 (2014) (providing a
thorough discussion of Washington’s Initiative 502).
201

James M. Cole, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum for All United States Attorneys
1 (2013), www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X8AT-3DER].
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Id. at 3.

204

Id. at 3–4.
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2019 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel, supra note 146.
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Daniller, supra note 146.

207

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol21/iss1/1

22

Carroll: Weed, Dogs & Traffic Stops

2021

Weed, Dogs & Traffic Stops

23

eight percent of residents supported a complete prohibition of the substance.208
Tracking with that support, thirty-seven states have legalized marijuana for
medicinal use.209 Sixteen of those states have also legalized marijuana for recrea
tional use.210 More than 207 million United States residents—nearly two thirds
of the country’s population—now live in a state that has legalized recreational or
medicinal marijuana.211 Nevertheless, marijuana remains a Schedule I substance
under the CSA.212

III. Dogs & the Fourth Amendment Redux
This part closely reexamines the Fourth Amendment’s treatment of dog
sniffs conducted during routine traffic stops. Section A illustrates that at least two
lower courts have begun to consider the effect that the legalization of marijuana
has on the Fourth Amendment principles governing dog sniffs conducted
during routine traffic stops.213 Building on those decisions, Section B makes two
arguments.214 First, it contends that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic
stop is a nonbinary type of investigative technique in the thirty-seven states that
have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use.215 Second, it asserts
that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment
“search” in those thirty-seven states.216

A. Re: The “Binary” Dog
This section identifies two lower courts that have considered whether a dog
sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search” in
208

Id.

State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 18. As of 2020, the thirty-seven states that
have legalized marijuana for medicinal use are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
209

Id. As of 2020, the sixteen states that have legalized marijuana for recreational use are
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Washington. Id.
210

211
Chris Nichols, Do a Majority of Americans Live in States with Legal Marijuana?, PolitiFact
(Apr. 19, 2018), www.politifact.com/factchecks/2018/apr/20/john-chiang/do-majority-americanslive-states-legal-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/DZ3L-UXT7].
212
21 U.S.C. § 812(c); see also Jared L. Hausmann, Sex, Drugs, and Due Process: Justice
Kennedy’s New Federalism as a Framework for Marijuana Liberalization, 53 U. Louisville L. Rev.
271, 279 (2015) (noting that marijuana remains illegal under the CSA, “along with drugs like
heroin and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)”).
213

See infra Section III.A.
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See infra Section III.B.
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See infra Section III.B.
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See infra Section III.B.
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states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. Implicit in
that question, this section demonstrates, is the threshold inquiry of whether a
dog sniff is a binary type of investigative technique in states that have legalized
recreational or medicinal marijuana.
In recent years, lower courts have begun to reexamine modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as it pertains to law enforcement’s use of drug-detection
dogs.217 Among those lower courts, at least two have considered whether a dog
sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search” in
states that have legalized recreational or medicinal marijuana.218 Consider first
State v. Souza, decided by the Washington Court of Appeals in 2017. In Souza,
Sergeant Loren Culp was performing “routine traffic patrol” when he observed
a grey truck driving over the speed limit.219 Sergeant Culp stopped the truck,
identified its driver as Jon Souza, and arrested Souza for driving with a suspended
license and failing to transfer vehicle title.220
After arresting Souza, Sergeant Culp retrieved his drug-detection dog,
Isko, from his patrol vehicle.221 Isko was trained “to detect the presence of
For instance, a number of lower courts have considered whether the odor of marijuana
provides probable cause to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search” in states that have legalized
recreational or medicinal marijuana or decriminalized the substance. See, e.g., United States v.
White, 732 F. App’x 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2018) (unpublished table opinion) (holding that, although
Nevada has legalized marijuana for medicinal use, the odor of marijuana provides probable cause
to conduct a warrantless “search” of a vehicle because the possession of nonmedical marijuana
remains “a state crime”); State v. Sisco, 373 P.3d 549, 553 (Ariz. 2016) (“Notwithstanding [the
Arizona Medical Marijuana Act], the odor of marijuana in most circumstances will warrant a
reasonable person believing there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime is
present.”); People v. Strasburg, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that,
although marijuana is legal for medicinal use in California, the odor of marijuana provides
police officers with probable cause to “search” a vehicle so that they may determine whether the
occupant is abiding by state law), modified, (Apr. 3, 2007); Johnson v. State, 275 So.3d 800, 802
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding that the odor of marijuana provides probable cause to
conduct a warrantless “search” of a vehicle regardless of “whether or not Florida law allows the
medical use of marijuana in some circumstances”); State v. Seckinger, 920 N.W.2d 842, 850 (Neb.
2018) (noting that, “[e]ven among states that have passed laws allowing medical or recreational
marijuana use, many courts continue to recognize that marijuana is contraband and that the odor
of marijuana can provide probable cause to search a vehicle”); Robinson v. State, 152 A.3d 661,
686–87 (Md. 2017) (holding “that a law enforcement officer has probable cause to search a vehicle
where the law enforcement officer detects an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, as
marijuana in any amount remains contraband, notwithstanding the decriminalization of possession of less than ten grams of marijuana”). The question of whether the odor of marijuana provides
probable cause to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search” in states that have legalized recreational or
medicinal marijuana or decriminalized the substance is outside the scope of this article.
217

218
See, e.g., People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶ 36, 446 P.3d 397, 406 (Colo. 2019); State v.
Souza, No. 34154-2-III, 2017 WL 2955534, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. July 11, 2017).
219

Souza, 2017 WL 2955534, at *1.
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Id. at *1–2.
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Id. at *2.
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marijuana, heroin, methamphetamine, crack cocaine, cocaine, and ecstasy,”
including miniscule amounts of those substances.222 Isko, however, was unable
to communicate which particular substance he detected or whether the substance
that he detected was in a measurable quantity.223 Sergeant Culp walked Isko
around Souza’s truck, and Isko gave a positive alert.224 Based on that alert, Sergeant
Culp received a warrant to search the truck.225 Inside, he found methamphetamine
and three pipes used to smoke methamphetamine.226
Prior to trial, Souza moved to suppress the methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia found inside his truck, arguing that Isko’s sniff was “an unlawful
search.”227 The trial court denied Souza’s motion and admitted the evidence.228
It conducted a bench trial and found “Souza guilty of possession of a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a suspended
license.”229 Following his convictions, Souza appealed the court’s denial of his
suppression motion.230
On appeal, Souza once again argued that the evidence found in his truck was
inadmissible because Isko’s sniff “unreasonably intruded in his privacy interest in
his truck.”231 The Washington Court of Appeals disagreed.232 Relying on Caballes,
the court began by noting that, “[a]ccording to federal law, a dog smell does not
constitute a search under the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.”233
It explained, however, that the Washington Constitution “generally provides
greater protection to persons . . . than the Fourth Amendment” because the
Washington Constitution “clearly recognizes an individual’s right to privacy with
no express limitations.”234
Under the Washington Constitution, the court further explained, a dog sniff
is not a search “[a]s long as the canine sniffs an object from an area where the

222
Id. Notably, “[t]he State of Washington trained and certified Isko for law enforcement work
before the effective date of Initiative 502 . . . .” Id.
223

Id.

224

Id.
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Id.

226

Id.

227

Id.

228

Id.

Id. at *3. The trial court “dismissed, for insufficient evidence, the charge of failure to
transfer a vehicle title.” Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *5.
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Id.
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Id. at *4.
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Id.
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defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy and the canine is minimally
intrusive . . . .”235 Tracking with that framework, the court reasoned that Isko’s
sniff of Souza’s truck was not a search because Souza had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the air outside of his vehicle.236 The court added that Isko’s sniff was
minimally intrusive because “Isko merely sauntered around the vehicle.”237 For
those reasons, the court held that Isko’s sniff was neither a Fourth Amendment
“search” nor a search under the Washington Constitution.238
Next, consider People v. McKnight, decided by the Colorado Supreme Court
in 2019.239 In McKnight, Craig Police Officer Bryan Gonzales observed a truck
“facing the wrong way in a one-way alley near an apartment complex.”240 Officer
Gonzalez followed the truck as it drove to and parked outside of a residence known
to be associated with narcotics activity.241 Fifteen minutes later, the truck drove
away from the residence, and Officer Gonzalez followed in pursuit.242 Officer
Gonzalez then observed the truck make an illegal turn, at which time he initiated
a traffic stop and identified the driver as Kevin McKnight.243
During the stop, Sergeant Courtland Folks arrived at the scene with his
drug-detection dog, Kilo.244 Kilo was trained to detect “marijuana,
methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy,”245 though he was unable
to communicate which “particular substance or amount of the substance” he
detected.246 Sergeant Folks walked Kilo around McKnight’s truck, and “Kilo
quickly alerted” to the presence of a controlled substance.247 Based on Kilo’s
alert, Officer Gonzalez and Sergeant Folks searched the truck and found a pipe
containing methamphetamine residue.248
Before trial, McKnight moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck.249
McKnight argued that Kilo’s sniff was an unlawful search under both the Fourth
235

Id.

236

Id.

237

Id. at *5.

238

Id.

239

People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, 446 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2019).

240

Id. at ¶ 10, 446 P.3d at 400.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id.

245

Id.

People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 93, ¶ 9, 452 P.3d 82, 85 (Colo. App. 2017), aff ’d, McKnight,
2019 CO 36, 446 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2019).
246

247

McKnight, at ¶ 13, 446 P.3d at 400 (internal quotations omitted).

248
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249

Id.
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Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the
Colorado Constitution.250 He reasoned that Kilo was trained to detect marijuana,
which is a legal substance in Colorado.251 The trial court denied McKnight’s
motion, reasoning that “possession of marijuana remains illegal under many
circumstances in Colorado and is categorically illegal under federal law.”252
McKnight was later found guilty of “possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia.”253 The Colorado Court of Appeals, however,
unanimously held “that the trial court erred in denying McKnight’s motion to
suppress” and “reversed McKnight’s convictions.”254
On writ of certiorari, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether Kilo’s
sniff was a search under the Fourth Amendment or Colorado Constitution.255
Beginning with the Fourth Amendment, the court provided a thorough discussion
of the United States Supreme Court precedent governing drug-detection dogs.256
It explained that “Caballes . . . did not address the effect of a state law legalizing
marijuana on the question of whether a resident of the state would have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in lawful possession of marijuana.”257 Nevertheless, it
concluded that, “arguably, Kilo’s sniff was not a search under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Caballes” because marijuana
remains categorically illegal under federal law.258
After reaching that conclusion, the court considered whether Kilo’s sniff was
a search under the Colorado Constitution.259 Answering that question in the
affirmative, the court held that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic
stop is a search under the Colorado Constitution.260 It explained that, in light of
Amendment 64, Colorado citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
possessing marijuana, just as they do in possessing other regulated items:
Marijuana is now treated like guns, alcohol, and tobacco—while
possession of these items is lawful under some circumstances,
it remains unlawful under others. Although possession of guns,

250

Id.

251

Id.

252

Id. at ¶ 16, 446 P.3d at 400–01.

253

Id. at ¶ 17, 446 P.3d at 401.

Id. The Colorado Court of Appeals was divided over whether Kilo’s sniff was a search under
the Colorado Constitution. Id.
254

255

Id. at ¶¶ 20–48, 446 P.3d at 401–10.

256

See id. at ¶¶ 22–37, 446 P.3d at 402–06.

257

Id. at ¶ 37, 446 P.3d at 406 n.4.

258

Id. at ¶ 37, 446 P.3d at 406.

259

Id. at ¶¶ 35– 48, 446 P.3d at 406–10.

260

Id. at ¶ 48, 446 P.3d at 410.
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alcohol, and tobacco can be unlawful, persons still maintain
an expectation of privacy in lawfully using or consuming those
items. The same now goes for marijuana: In legalizing marijuana
for adults twenty-one and older, Amendment 64 expanded the
protections of [Colorado’s Constitution] to provide a reasonable
expectation of privacy to engage in the lawful activity of
possessing marijuana in Colorado.261
Because “a sniff from a dog trained to detect marijuana (in addition to other
substances) can reveal lawful activity,” the court reasoned that such a sniff violates
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.262 It therefore concluded that
Kilo’s sniff was a search under the Colorado Constitution.263
Souza and McKnight illustrate that lower courts have begun reexamining the
Fourth Amendment’s treatment of dog sniffs conducted during routine traffic
stops. Both cases raise the question of whether a dog sniff conducted during a
routine traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search” in states that have legalized
marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. Implicit in that question is the
threshold inquiry of whether a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop
remains a binary type of investigative technique in states that have legalized
recreational or medicinal marijuana. As we will see, though, neither Souza nor
McKnight provide answers to those questions that holistically align with modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

B. The (Non)Binary Dog
In response to Souza and McKnight, this section makes two arguments. First,
it asserts that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a nonbinary
type of investigative technique in the thirty-seven states that have legalized
marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. Second, it contends that a dog sniff
conducted during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search” in states
that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. It makes both
arguments by examining Souza and McKnight against the backdrop of modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In Souza, the Washington Court of Appeals reached two erroneous
conclusions. First, the court erred in characterizing a dog sniff during a routine

261

Id. at ¶ 42, 446 P.3d at 408 (internal citations omitted).

262

Id. at ¶ 48, 446 P.3d at 410.

Id. The court further held “that a dog sniff . . . must be supported by probable cause and
justified under an exception to the warrant requirement, such as the automobile exception.” Id. at
¶ 55, 446 P.3d at 412. The level of suspicion needed to conduct a dog sniff in states that have
legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use is outside the scope of this article.
263
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traffic stop as a “minimally intrusive” form of investigation in Washington.264
The United States Supreme Court has stressed that a dog sniff is a minimally
intrusive—i.e., binary—type of investigative technique only when it is incapable
of revealing lawful activity.265 Marijuana is legal for recreational and medicinal
use in Washington.266 Isko was trained to alert to marijuana at the time he sniffed
Souza’s truck.267 Accordingly, Isko was capable of revealing lawful activity in
Washington. Isko’s sniff was therefore not minimally intrusive; rather, it was a
nonbinary type of investigative technique.
Second, the Souza court erred in concluding that a dog sniff conducted
during a routine traffic stop fails to implicate Fourth Amendment protection in
Washington.268 The court’s reliance on Caballes for the per se rule that a dog
sniff is not a Fourth Amendment “search” is an overbroad characterization of
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.269 In the context of routine traffic
stops, a dog sniff is not a Fourth Amendment “search” so long as it is capable
only of revealing “the location of a substance that no individual has any right to
possess . . . .”270 Again, Isko was trained to alert to marijuana,271 a substance that
certain individuals have a right to possess under Washington law.272 Isko’s sniff was
therefore a Fourth Amendment “search.”
By contrast, the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in McKnight more
closely aligns with modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence established by
the United States Supreme Court. The McKnight court correctly concluded
that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a nonbinary type of

264

State v. Souza, No. 34154-2-III, 2017 WL 2955534, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. July 11, 2017).

See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (reasoning that a dog sniff conducted
during a routine traffic stop is minimally intrusive because it detects only the presence of an
illegal substance, in which there exists no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (explaining that a dog sniff is minimally intrusive because
“[i]t does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view”).
265

266

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.4013 (2020).

267

Souza, 2017 WL 2955534, at *4.

268

Id.

Id. Less generously, the Souza Court’s per se rule that a “dog smell” is not a Fourth
Amendment “search” is flat out wrong. Id. A dog sniff conducted while physically trespassing on
a constitutionally protected area is a Fourth Amendment “search.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1,
4 (2013).
269

Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added); cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32 (2000) (explaining that a dog sniff of a vehicle stopped at a highway checkpoint is not a Fourth
Amendment “search” because it is incapable of detecting lawful activity); Place, 462 U.S. at 707
(1983) (holding that a dog sniff of luggage is not a Fourth Amendment “search” because it discloses
only the presence or absence of contraband).
270

271

Souza, 2017 WL 2955534, at *4.

272

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.4013 (2020).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2021

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 21 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1

30	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 21

investigative technique in Colorado.273 The McKnight court reasoned that certain
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in possessing marijuana in
Colorado, just as they do in possessing guns, alcohol, and tobacco.274 Accordingly,
as the McKnight court recognized, a dog trained to detect marijuana is capable of
revealing lawful activity in Colorado.275 Kilo was trained to detect marijuana.276
Thus, Kilo’s sniff was a nonbinary type of investigative technique.
Nonetheless, the McKnight court mistakenly concluded that a dog sniff
conducted during a routine traffic stop is not a Fourth Amendment “search” in
Colorado.277 In reaching that conclusion, the McKnight court misinterpreted the
Supreme Court precedent governing law enforcement’s use of drug-detection dogs
in the context of routine traffic stops.278 The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned
that, notwithstanding Amendment 64, a dog sniff conducted during a routine
traffic stop is “arguably” not a Fourth Amendment “search” in Colorado because
marijuana remains illegal under federal law.279 In Caballes, however, the United
States Supreme Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop
is not a Fourth Amendment “search” so long as it is capable of revealing only the
location of an illegal substance.280
In Colorado, a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is capable
of revealing the location of a substance that certain individuals have a right to
possess.281 The McKnight court acknowledged that Amendment 64 gives certain
individuals a right to possess marijuana for recreational use.282 The court also
accurately noted that drug-detection dogs are incapable of distinguishing between
lawfully possessed marijuana and unlawfully possessed marijuana.283 As a result,
a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is capable of revealing the
location of a potentially lawful substance in Colorado.284 Again, Kilo was trained
to alert to marijuana, among other substances.285 Kilo’s sniff, therefore, constituted
a Fourth Amendment “search.”
273

See People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶¶ 47–50, 446 P.3d 397, 410 (Colo. 2019).

274

Id. at ¶ 42, 446 P.3d at 408.

275

Id.

276

Id. at ¶ 7, 446 P.3d at 400.

277

Id. at ¶ 37, 446 P.3d at 406.

278

Id.

279

Id.

280

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (emphasis added).

281

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16.

282

McKnight, at ¶¶ 41–43, 446 P.3d at 408.

283

Id. at ¶ 47, 446 P.3d at 410.

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16 (legalizing marijuana for recreational use by certain individ
uals in Colorado).
284

285

McKnight, at ¶ 6, 446 P.3d at 399–400.
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From a broader perspective, the above examination of Souza and McKnight
leads to two conclusions that are equally applicable in every state that has
legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. First, drug-detection dogs
are no longer a binary type of investigative technique in the context of routine
traffic stops.286 The reason is that they are capable of disclosing lawful activity.287
Thus, a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a nonbinary type of
investigative technique in the thirty-seven states that have legalized marijuana for
recreational or medicinal use.
Second, a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth
Amendment “search” in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or
medicinal use. Under modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a dog sniff
conducted during a routine traffic stop is not a Fourth Amendment “search” so
long as it is capable of revealing only the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess.288 In states that have legalized marijuana,
certain individuals have a right to possess marijuana under state law.289 Moreover,
drug-detection dogs are incapable of distinguishing between a potentially legal
substance and one that is categorically illegal.290 To the contrary, they exhibit the
same alert regardless of the substance they sniff.291
In People v. Gadberry, a companion case decided alongside McKnight, the
Colorado Supreme Court put it best: “Marijuana isn’t meth. But drug-detection
dog Talu can’t tell the difference. So when Talu alerted to the driver and passenger
side doors of Amanda Gadberry’s truck, the officers didn’t know whether Talu
had found marijuana, which is legal in some circumstances in Colorado, or meth,
286
It is worth noting that in some contexts drug-detection dogs likely remain a binary type of
investigative technique in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use. See
infra notes 332–35 and accompanying text.
287

See sources cited supra notes 11, 126 and accompanying text.

See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
38– 40 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal-imaging device “to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion” is a Fourth Amendment
“search” if the device is capable of detecting lawful activity and not in “general public use”); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (concluding that a dog sniff of a vehicle stopped
at a highway checkpoint is not a Fourth Amendment “search” because it discloses no “information
other than the presence or absence of narcotics”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984) (“[G]overnmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other
arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.”); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a dog sniff of luggage is not a Fourth Amendment “search”
because “it discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item”).
288

289

State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 18.

See Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 12, at 754 (“[I]t is not possible for a dog to distinguish
the scent of all contraband from otherwise legal substances. Heroine is a derivative of opium.
The odor in heroin which alerts the dog is acetic acid, a common substance used in pickles and
certain glues.”).
290

291

Id.
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which never is.”292 In sum, then, a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic
stop is a Fourth Amendment “search” in the thirty-seven states that have legalized
marijuana for recreational or medicinal use.

IV. Nonbinary Dogs & Law Enforcement
The legalization of marijuana has fundamentally altered the application
of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to dog sniffs conducted during
routine traffic stops.293 This part explores the resulting, downstream impact on
the law enforcement profession. Section A argues that law enforcement agencies
operating in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use
must retrain their drug-detection dogs to be incapable of revealing the location
of marijuana or replace their drug-detection dogs with those that are incapable
of the same.294 Section B demonstrates the financial and administrative obstacles
that law enforcement agencies will face as they replace and retrain their drugdetection dogs.295 Section B also provides law enforcement agencies with ways to
mitigate those challenges.296

A. Out with the Nonbinary
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized “the virtue of providing
‘clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession.’”297 The
Court has reasoned that the Fourth Amendment’s protections “can only be
realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances,
makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an
invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.”298
In that spirit, this section seeks to provide the law enforcement profession
with a clear constitutional path forward. It argues that law enforcement agencies
292

People v. Gadberry, 2019 CO 37, ¶ 1, 440 P.3d 449, 451 (Colo. 2019).

293

See supra Part III.

294

See infra Section IV.A.

295

See infra Section IV.B.

296

See infra Section IV.B.

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 (1991) (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S.
146, 151 (1990)); accord Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622–23 (2004) (acknowledging
the importance of establishing clear Fourth Amendment rules that are “readily understood by
police officers”); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) (recognizing the benefits
of “providing ‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines to the law enforcement profession”); Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986) (“As we have stressed on numerous occasions, ‘[o]ne of the
principal advantages’ of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application.” (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984))).
297

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne LaFave, Case-By-Case
Adjudication Versus Standardized Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 141
(1974)), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
298
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operating in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use
must retrain their drug-detection dogs to be incapable of revealing the location
of marijuana or replace their drug-detection dogs with those that are incapable of
the same.
One cardinal principle of the Fourth Amendment is that a warrantless
“search” is presumptively unlawful “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”299 Typically, these exceptions justify a
warrantless Fourth Amendment “search” only when there exists some level of
suspicion of criminal activity,300 such as probable cause 301 or reasonable suspicion.302 Absent consent,303 no well-established exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement justifies a suspicionless vehicular “search”
during a routine traffic stop.304

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 414 (1967) (footnote omitted)).
299

See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580 (automobile exception, probable cause); Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (exigent circumstances, probable cause); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (search incident to arrest, suspicionless so long as the underlying arrest
is based on probable cause); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (inventory searches,
suspicionless); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (stop and (perhaps) frisk, the first of which
requires reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot and the second of which requires
reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is armed and dangerous).
300

301
Probable cause to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search” exists when there is “a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in the area to be searched. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
302
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, requiring
“something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
303
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well settled that one of
the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause
is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”).
304
See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (explaining that, absent probable
cause, “police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his automobile or other effects”);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (clarifying that, “[i]n the absence
of probable cause or consent,” a warrantless search of a vehicle is unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment); cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (holding that the police “may
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest if the arrestee is within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest”); Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580 (holding that the police
may conduct a warrantless “search” of a vehicle and its containers where there is “probable cause
to believe contraband or evidence is contained”); Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 (holding that the
police may warrantlessly “search” a vehicle in police custody so long as the “search” is conducted
pursuant to “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good
faith . . . .”); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (holding that a police officer may
warrantlessly search “the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which
a weapon may be placed or hidden,” when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that an
occupant “is dangerous . . . and may gain immediate control of weapons”). See generally Bradley,
supra note 39, at 1474 (listing and describing the exceptions to the warrant requirement).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2021

33

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 21 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1

34	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 21

Considering these Fourth Amendment principles, scholars have previously
questioned whether the legalization of marijuana would require law enforcement
agencies to retrain or replace their drug-detection dogs.305 In recent years, many law
enforcement agencies have begun considering the same question.306 Some agencies
have sought answers from the legal community.307 Others have reached answers of
their own.308 Consider two illustrative examples, one from Colorado and the other
from New York.309
See, e.g., Alex Kreit, Marijuana Legalization and Pretextual Stops, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
741, 770 (2016) (discussing “the potential of marijuana legalization laws to impact street-level
policing”); Ben Adams, Note, What Is Fourth Amendment Contraband?, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1137,
1195 (2017) (concluding that, “if marijuana becomes legitimate to possess . . . [p]olice dogs already
trained to detect marijuana will have to be either retrained or replaced because the police would
no longer be assured in advance that an alert from those dogs indicates only contraband”); Lindsay
N. Zanello, Note, To Sniff or Not to Sniff: Making Sense of Past and Recent State and Federal
Decisions in Connection with Drug-Detection Dogs—Where Do We Go from Here?, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 1569,
1603 (2015) (commenting that, in states that have legalized marijuana, law enforcement agencies will
have to show that “[a] dog was effectively retrained to not alert to a drug that is no longer illegal”).
305

David Ferland, executive director of the United States Police Canine Association, has
stated that “[a]lmost every state” is considering the impact that legalized marijuana will have on law
enforcement’s use of drug-detection dogs. Matthew Russell, Here’s Why Hundreds of Drug-Sniffing
Dogs are Headed Toward Early Retirement, The Animal Rescue Site Blog, blog.theanimalrescuesite.
greatergood.com/drug-dogs/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F9Y2-BWCW].
306

See, e.g., Am. Addiction Ctrs., You’re Fired: Police Departments Weaning K9’s Off Marijuana,
Drugabuse.com (June 11, 2019), www.drugabuse.com/youre-fired-police-departments-weaningk9s-off-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/9HTG-N7J2] (explaining that some law enforcement
“agencies are taking a wait-and-see approach” to determine the effect that legalized marijuana will
have on police’s use of drug-detection dogs); Jon Campbell, Drug Dogs Face an Uncertain Fate if
Marijuana Is Legalized in New York, USA Today (May 22, 2019, 1:55 PM), www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2019/05/22/why-drug-dogs-new-york-face-uncertainty-if-marijuanalegalized/3768232002/ [https://perma.cc/DGS9-R8G6] (“Sgt. Shawn Edwards, the [Monroe,
New York] Sheriff ’s Office’s K-9 commander, said legalization would have ‘some impact but only
on certain situations,’ though he acknowledged it’s difficult to say definitively because lawmakers
and [Governor] Cuomo haven’t locked down a final agreement.”); Gel Galang, K9 Dogs’ Training
Will Change With Marijuana Legalization, dogtime.com, www.dogtime.com/reference/dog-laws/
72043-k9-dogs-training-change-marijuana-legalization (last visited Nov. 19, 2020) [https://perma.
cc/ZER8-M9S6] (noting that Cottonwood Heights, Utah Officer Ken Eatchel has stated that his
department needs “some clarification with the legal community and with the attorneys [to] determine”
the effect that legalized marijuana has on the use of drug-detection dogs).
307

See, e.g., Pete Sherman, Cannabis Sniffing Dogs Staying Around: An Illinois K-9 Trainer, Skilled
Enough to Also Train a Drug-Sniffing Pig, Discusses the World of Detection Dogs, 108 Ill. B.J. 10, 11
(2020) (commenting that some Illinois law enforcement officials have started training their drugdetection dogs to ignore the odor of marijuana); Yessenia Renee Medrano-Vossler, Comment, Sniff
and Search Border Militarization, 14 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 915, 940 (2016) (explaining that,
in response to the movement to legalize marijuana, “some local police departments have removed
drug-dogs from their police work to eliminate the possibility of conducting an illegal search”);
Ian Millhiser, Washington Police Retraining Drug Dogs not to Sniff for Marijuana after Legalization,
thinkprogress (Mar. 21, 2013, 1:00 PM), thinkprogress.org/washington-police-retraining-drugdogs-not-to-sniff-for-marijuana-after-legalization-4559f0fecfd9/ [https://perma.cc/8YTR-ZELB]
(noting that some Washington law enforcement agencies have begun retraining their drug-detection
dogs to be incapable of alerting to marijuana).
308

309

For additional illustrative examples, see discussion infra Section IV.B.
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In August 2015, the Police Foundation and the Colorado Association of
Chiefs of Police published Colorado’s Legalization of Marijuana and the Impact on
Public Safety: A Practical Guide for Law Enforcement, in which they cite one “key
issue” as “Drug-Sniffing Canines May Have To Be Retrained or Replaced.”310 The
report asks judicial officials and policy makers to determine the constitutional
effect of legalized marijuana on law enforcement’s use of drug-detection dogs “for
general drug searches.”311 If marijuana is legal, the report explains, police officers
can no longer be certain that a drug-detection dog is alerting to an unlawful
substance.312 It therefore opines that “[n]ewly trained drug-sniffing dogs may be
required in states where marijuana has been legalized.”313
In New York, where marijuana is legal only for medicinal use,314 at least two
law enforcement agencies are already replacing their drug-detection dogs.315 The
Buffalo Police Department is replacing its retired drug-detection dogs with those
that are not trained to reveal the location of marijuana.316 Similarly, the Erie
County Sheriff ’s Office is replacing five of its drug-detection dogs with those
that are not trained to detect marijuana.317 When asked about the transition, Erie
County Undersheriff Mark Wipperman commented, “We believe, in the Sheriff ’s
Office, that the writing is on the wall.”318
In the context of routine traffic stops, the writing is clear: Drug-detection
dogs are a nonbinary type of investigative technique in states that have legalized
marijuana for recreational or medicinal use.319 In those states, a dog sniff conducted
during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “search.”320 Absent consent,
the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from conducting a warrantless
vehicular “search” during a routine traffic stop.321 Thus, law enforcement agencies

Police Found. & Colo. Ass’n of Police Chiefs, Colorado’s Legalization of
Marijuana and the Impact on Public Safety: A Practical Guide for Law Enforcement 15
(2015), www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Legalized_Marijuana_Practical_Guide_for_Law_
Enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS2Q-UN55].
310

311

Id. at 16.

312

Id. at 15.

313

Id. at 16.

314

See supra note 209 and accompanying text.

Sandra Tan, Early Retirement Beckons for Marijuana-Sniffing K-9s, Buffalo News (Dec.
8, 2020), buffalonews.com/2020/01/27/early-retirement-beckons-for-k-9s-with-a-less-urgent-skillsniffing-out-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/A7QR-W43K].
315

316

Id.

317

Id.

318

Id. (cleaned up).

319

See supra Section III.B.

320

See supra Section III.B.

321

See supra notes 303– 04 and accompanying text.
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operating in the thirty-seven states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or
medicinal use must retrain their drug-detection dogs to be incapable of revealing
the location of marijuana or replace their drug-detection dogs with those that are
incapable of the same.

B. In with the Binary
In the context of routine traffic stops, the constitutional path forward is clear:
Law enforcement agencies operating in states that have legalized marijuana for
recreational or medicinal use must retrain or replace their drug-detection dogs.
But “there is a difference between knowing the path and walking the path.”322 To
that end, this section illustrates the financial and administrative challenges that
law enforcement agencies will face as they retrain their drug-detection dogs to be
incapable of revealing the location of marijuana or replace their drug-detection
dogs with those that are incapable of the same. It also provides illustrative examples
of ways that law enforcement agencies can mitigate those challenges.
Retraining or replacing every drug-detection dog across the thirty-seven
states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use will have a
significant financial impact on the law enforcement profession.323 As a threshold
matter, experts disagree about whether it is possible to retrain a drug-detection
dog to be incapable of revealing the location of a substance to which it has been
trained to alert.324 Normal, Illinois Assistant Police Chief Steve Petrill has opined
that “it would be impossible to teach the dogs to ignore odors they have been
trained to recognize since they were young.”325 Similarly, Chad Larner, training

322

The Matrix (Warner Bros. 1999).

See, e.g., Elyssa Cherney, Experts Dismiss Central Illinois Cop’s Claim that Legalizing Pot
Would Lead to Euthanizing Drug-Sniffing Dogs, Chicago Trib. (May 9, 2018, 12:50 PM), www.
chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-legal-marijuana-police-dogs-20180509-story.html
(explaining that retraining a drug-detection dog would be “difficult and costly”); Stacy Cowley,
Marijuana Legalization Threatens These Dogs’ Collars, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 2018), www.nytimes.
com/2018/11/24/business/marijuana-legalization-police-dogs.html (discussing the financial burden
that retraining or replacing drug-detection dogs would have on law enforcement agencies and
commenting that, even in states where marijuana remains illegal, many dogs “are no longer being
trained to sniff out pot”).
323

324
See, e.g., Am. Addiction Ctrs., supra note 307 (explaining that “[t]rainers and handlers
are in disagreement about the potential success” of retraining a drug-detection dog to be incapable
of revealing the location of a substance to which it has been trained to alert); Damian Mann,
Pot-Sniffing Dogs Headed for Early Retirement, Mail Trib. (Apr. 30, 2015), mailtribune.com/news/
crime-courts-emergencies/pot-sniffing-dogs-headed-for-early-retirement (“Officer Eric Sorby of the
Springfield Police Department . . . said there are arguments about whether a dog can be retrained,
but to err on the safe side, his dog was trained to detect only methamphetamine, heroin and
cocaine.”); Russell, supra note 306 (noting that it is “much harder to retrain a dog than it is to train
them for the first time”).

Ryan Voyles, If Illinois Legalizes Marijuana, What Happens to Pot-Sniffing Dogs, The
Pantagraph (May 8, 2018), www.pantagraph.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/if-illinois-legalizes325
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director of the K-9 Training Academy in Macon County, Illinois, has stated that
“it would amount to ‘extreme abuse’” to retrain a drug-detection dog.326
However, Mary Cablk, a scientist who studies dog-handler teams at the Desert
Research Institute in Reno, Nevada, has stated that “[r]etraining a dog to stop
alerting on a particular scent, such as marijuana, is fairly straightforward . . . .327
She explained that, “[i]f a trainer stops rewarding a dog for alerting a handler to the
presence of a particular scent, then the alert behavior can be unlearned.”328 Simi
larly, Bill Lewis II, a spokesman for the California Narcotics Canine Association,
has commented that “most trainers agree the dogs can be retrained.”329 But he
added that it is likely “too expensive and time-consuming” to be worth the effort.330
In terms of expense, the cost of training a drug-detection dog ranges from
$12,000 to $15,000, “depending on the length of each class.”331 The training
process can last up to four months, during which time the dog’s handler must
stop performing his or her ordinary police duties to train alongside the dog.332
The handler’s absence can result in his or her department incurring a salary
expense of over $20,000.333 Considering the uncertainty and financial costs of
retraining, law enforcement agencies may choose to simply replace their drugdetection dogs instead.334

marijuana-what-happens-to-pot-sniffing-dogs/article_6d67b6d3-cc27-5053-ba8c-eb641611c28b.
html [https://perma.cc/GJN3-UQ79] (noting that “some handlers say” it is “impossible or imprac
tical” to retrain a drug-detection dog).
326

Id.

Jane J. Lee, Detection Dogs: Learning to Pass the Sniff Test, Nat’l Geographic News (Apr. 8,
2013), www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/4/detection-dogs-learning-to-pass-the-sniff-test/
[https://perma.cc/BH6J-9Q6B].
327

328

Id.

Beth Winegarner, Pot-Sniffing Police Dogs Face Uncertain Future, GreenState (Nov. 26,
2017), www.greenstate.com/news/marijuana-finding-police-dogs-face-uncertain-future/ [https://
perma.cc/P4QA-HEKS].
329

330

Id.

Frequent Questions, The Nat’l Police Dog Found., www.nationalpolicedogfoundation.
org/faq (last visited Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TR2P-FYV2].
331

Brett Geiger, People v. Caballes: An Analysis of Caballes, the History of Sniff Search Juris
prudence, and Its Future Impact, 26 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 595, 619 (2006).
332

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Outlook Handbook,
Police and Detectives (2019), www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm
(last modified Apr. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F2E9-FL3E] (listing the 2019 median annual
income of police officers and detectives as $65,140).
333

334
Dave Smith, the head trainer at Ventosa Kennel, advises law enforcement agencies against
retraining their drug-detection dogs because they will likely face a heightened burden to prove
the dogs’ reliability in court. Travis Fedschun, Drug-Sniffing Dogs Facing Early Retirements Due to
Legalization of Marijuana, Fox News (Nov. 26, 2018), www.foxnews.com/us/drug-sniffing-dogsfacing-early-retirements-due-to-legalization-of-marijuana [https://perma.cc/T9U3-PYRB].
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But the decision to replace drug-detections dogs will come with a high
price tag of its own.335 One untrained drug-detection dog costs approximately
$8,000.336 Buying and training a dog together costs around $13,000.337
Additionally, acquiring a drug-detection dog comes with routine expenses—such
as new equipment and veterinary examinations—which can run from $2,500 to
$3,000 annually.338 All things considered, it typically costs $20,000 for one drugdetection dog “to enter the force.”339 Holistically, it will cost the law enforcement
profession millions of dollars to retrain or replace every drug-detection dog
currently working in a state that has legalized marijuana for recreational or
medicinal use.340
This financial burden will primarily be split among individual law enforcement
agencies,341 many of which will need additional funding to afford the cost of
retraining or replacing their drug-detection dogs.342 The question becomes: Where
will the additional funding come from? One possibility is that law enforcement
agencies could request a subsidy or budget supplement from their local or state
governments.343 For example, after Oregon legalized marijuana for recreational
use in 2014, the Medford City Police Department requested $24,000 from its

335
See Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth
Amendment, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 549, 581 (2013) (explaining that the up-front cost of one
drug-detection dog is “between $5,000 and $8,000”).
336

Frequent Questions, supra note 331.

K9 Prices, Castle’s K9, www.castlek9.com/prices.php (last visited July 1, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/A56K-P93W] (listing one drug-detection dog, a patrol and narcotics training course, and
several items of equipment for a combined cost of $14,450).
337

338
George S. Steffen & Samuel M. Candelaria, Drug Interdiction: Partnerships, Legal
Principles, and Investigative Methodologies for Law Enforcement 64 (2d ed. 2010).
339
The Cost of Raising a K9, Pawderosa Ranch (Aug. 17, 2015), pawderosaranch.com/thecost-of-raising-a-k9/ [https://perma.cc/7JQC-D24H].
340
See Voyles, supra note 325 (explaining that “[r]eplacing all of the K9 units in [Illinois] would
cost millions” of dollars). In 2017, California law enforcement agencies employed an estimated
800 drug-detection dogs. Winegarner, supra note 329. Assuming the average cost of replacing or
retraining a drug-detection dog was $10,000, it would cost approximately $8,000,000 to replace or
retrain all the drug-detection dogs in California alone. In 2014, Oregon law enforcement agencies
employed a total of 150 dogs, 60 of which were “assigned to drug-enforcement.” Mann, supra note
324. Replacing all of Oregon’s drug-detection dogs would therefore cost roughly $600,000.
341
See Voyles, supra note 325 (noting that the cost of replacing or retraining “all of the K9
units in [Illinois] . . . would fall on each individual law enforcement agency”).
342
See, e.g., Noel Brennan, Why Legal Pot is Forcing Some Drug Dogs into Early Retirement,
King 5, www.king5.com/article/news/why-legal-pot-is-forcing-some-drug-dogs-into-retirement/
281-618052573 (last updated Nov. 27, 2018, 10:12 AM) [https://perma.cc/9LV5-JRS3] (explaining
that some “smaller Colorado departments” cannot afford replacing their drug-detection dogs with
“non-marijuana certified dogs”).

See Frequent Questions, supra note 331 (“Many police agencies do not have a budget for
police dogs, so they are purchased by public and/or corporate donations.”).
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city government to purchase “new dogs trained to smell only heroin, cocaine and
methamphetamine, and not marijuana.”344
Another possibility is that law enforcement agencies could seek donations
from private foundations.345 In 2016, Macon County Sheriff Howard Buffett—
middle child of billionaire Warren Buffett—donated over two million dollars to
“K-9 units in 33 counties across Illinois” through his private charity, the Howard
G. Buffett Foundation.346 The following year, he commented that, in states that
have legalized marijuana, one of the biggest challenges facing law enforcement
agencies is that they are “going to have to replace all of [their] dogs.”347 In June
2019, Illinois legalized marijuana for recreational use.348 Howard Buffett is no
longer the Sheriff of Macon County,349 but perhaps he will make another donation
to the canine programs of Illinois.350
Finally, law enforcement agencies could turn to their communities for
financial assistance.351 In July 2016, the Waymart, Pennsylvania Police Department
created a “Go Fund Me” page online, seeking $5,000 in community donations
to pay for training its then new drug-detection dog.352 In the four years since,

344

Mann, supra note 324.

See, e.g., Foundation, Big Ben 7, bigben7.com/the-ben-roethlisberger-foundation/ (last
visited July 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G6HE-7BZY] (“The Ben Roethlisberger Foundation seeks
to support police and fire departments throughout the U.S. with a particular emphasis on support
for K-9 units and service dogs.” (emphasis omitted)).
345

346

Voyles, supra note 325.

347

Id.

Vincent Caruso & Austin Berg, Illinois Becomes the 11th State to Legalize Recreational
Marijuana, Ill. Policy (June 25, 2019), www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-becomes-11th-state-tolegalize-recreational-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/F3TA-MHVS].
348

Howard Buffett served as the Macon County Sheriff “from September 2017 to December
2018.” Kennedy Nolen, Howard Buffett Donates $75,000 for Sheriff ’s Office Overtime, Herald &
Rev. (Feb. 13, 2020), herald-review.com/news/local/public_safety/howard-buffett-donates-75-000for-sheriffs-office-overtime/article_1f6d9cb8-30ed-5c2a-8a9b-b2e1527a2da5.html [https://perma.
cc/KG5E-9P7E].
349

350
Over the years, the Howard G. Buffett Foundation has donated millions of dollars to
Macon County Community. See Some of What the Buffett Foundation has Funded in Macon
County, Herald & Rev. (July 3, 2019), herald-review.com/lifestyles/some-of-what-the-buffettfoundation-has-funded-in-maconcounty/collection_6ec2b4eb-ff4e-501a-92f0-3192f5fe6072.
html#1 [https://perma.cc/68CH-MEJB]. In February 2020, the foundation donated $75,000 dollars “to cover overtime expenses for Macon County deputies who serve warrants.” Nolen, supra
note 349.

See Frequent Questions, supra note 331 (explaining that because “[m]any police agencies do
not have a budget for police dogs,” they often “need donations to pay for the dog’s training, as well
as veterinary bills, daily food and training equipment”).
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Waymart Canine Unit, GoFundMe (created July 14, 2016), www.gofundme.com/f/
2ebvbqac [https://perma.cc/RKF2-EZN8].
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however, it has only received $1,515 in donations via Go Fund Me.353 Similarly,
in December 2019, the Menominee, Michigan Police Department created a “Go
Fund Me” page in hopes of raising $75,000 to subsidize the department’s first
ever K-9 unit.354 As of August 2020, it has only received $360 via Go Fund Me.355
In addition to the financial burden of retraining or replacing drug-detection
dogs, law enforcement agencies will face administrative challenges associated
with determining what to do with the drug-detection dogs that they replace,
but do not retrain356—i.e., their nonbinary dogs. One possibility is that law
enforcement agencies could send their nonbinary dogs to work in states that have
not legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use.357 The Colorado Police
K9 Association, for instance, adopts drug-detection dogs from Colorado law
enforcement agencies and sends “them to states where marijuana is still illegal.”358
Another possibility is that law enforcement agencies could employ their
drug-detection dogs in places where marijuana remains categorically illegal.359
Even in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal use, the
substance remains unlawful in certain places, such as a prison or school.360 In such
places, a dog trained to detect marijuana remains a binary type of investigative
technique because it is unable to detect lawful activity.361 Stated differently, the

353

Id.

Menominee City Police K9 Program, GoFundMe (created Dec. 29, 2019), www.gofundme.
com/f/menominee-city-police-k9-program.
354

355

Id.

See, e.g., Alexa Peters, Here’s What Really Happens to Drug Dogs in Legal Cannabis
States, Leafly (May 11, 2018), www.leafly.com/news/politics/heres-what-really-happens-to-drugdogs-in-legal-cannabis-states [https://perma.cc/7XN8-P38T] (describing the administrative
approaches that law enforcement agencies in Alaska, Illinois and Washington are taking with
respect to their drug-detection dogs); Randy Robinson, Police Dogs Enjoy Early Retirement as
Virginia Prepares to Decriminalize Marijuana, Merry Jane (Mar. 11, 2020), merryjane.com/news/
police-dogs-enjoy-early-retirement-as-virginia-prepares-to-decriminalize-weed [https://perma.cc/
HRW5-JACR] (noting that many Virginia law enforcement agencies have chosen to retire their
drug-detection dogs).
356

357
See Russell, supra note 306 (explaining that drug-detection dogs can still be used “in states
where marijuana is illegal”).
358

Brennan, supra note 342.

A related option is that law enforcement agencies could assign their drug-detection dogs to
an entirely new line of work, such as search and rescue. See Shanna Lewis, Legal Pot Changes the Work of
Some Drug Detection Dogs, Wyo. Pub. Media (Dec. 20, 2018), www.wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/
legal-pot-changes-work-some-drug-detection-dogs#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5TJG-YWGF].
359

360
See Russell, supra note 306 (noting that, in states that have legalized marijuana for
recreational or medicinal use, drug-detection “dogs can still be used in schools and jails” because
marijuana remains illegal in those places).
361

See sources cited supra notes 11, 126 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol21/iss1/1

40

Carroll: Weed, Dogs & Traffic Stops

2021

Weed, Dogs & Traffic Stops

41

same drug-detection dog that is a nonbinary type of investigative technique in the
context of routine traffic stops remains a binary type of investigative technique in
the context of prisons and schools.362
Putting this option into practice, the Larimer County, Colorado Sheriff ’s
Office “retains two dogs that are trained for marijuana in the county jail, where
the substance remains illegal to possess.”363 Similarly, Michigan State Police are
using their fifty-five drug-detection dogs in places where marijuana remains
categorically illegal, including “school busses, prisons, and schools.”364 Practically,
then, the test for determining whether a dog sniff is a binary type of investigative
technique in states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal
use is something of a hybrid between the Katz Test and the Constitutional
Trespass Test.365
Lastly, law enforcement agencies could give their drug-detection dogs an
early retirement.366 Assuming a Floridian suburb is out of the question, law
enforcement agencies could send their drug-detection dogs to the homes of their
handlers to live as household pets.367 In doing so, law enforcement agencies might
consider working with nonprofit organizations that assist canine handlers with
adopting retired drug-detection dogs.368 The Retired Police Canine Foundation,
New Jersey Attorney General Gubir Grewal has stated that “New Jersey’s police can still
rely on previously-trained dogs to find cannabis at . . . places where marijuana is banned, like
prisons and schools.” Randy Robinson, New Jersey Police Will No Longer Train Drug Dogs to Sniff
Out Weed, Merry Jane (Apr. 5, 2019), merryjane.com/news/new-jersey-police-will-no-longer-traindrug-dogs-to-sniff-out-weed [https://perma.cc/UPK6-C3FB].
362

Sady Swanson, Future of Drug-Sniffing Dogs Uncertain After Colorado Supreme Court
Ruling, The Coloradoan (July 23, 2019, 12:57 PM), www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2019/07/18/
marijuana-sniffing-dogs-fading-out-use-after-colorado-supreme-court-ruling/1420641001/
[https://perma.cc/8CTM-PY7Z].
363

364
Beth LeBlanc, Marijuana Legalization May Lead to Changes in Police Dog Training, The
Detroit News (Jan. 22, 2019, 9:41 AM), www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/
2019/01/21/marijuana-legalization-may-lead-police-dogs-early-retirement/2636941002/ [https://
perma.cc/E6RQ-NB57].
365

See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.

See Cherney, supra note 323 (noting that, in response to the legalization of marijuana,
“some departments may opt to retire canines early,” at which time “they generally get to enjoy a life
of leisure as a family pet at their handler’s house . . . .”).
366

367
See Frequent Questions, supra note 331 (explaining that, upon retirement, a drug-detection
dog “lives at home with its handler to live out its life as a family pet”).
368
The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals International (“SPCAI”) provides
an illustrative example of one such organization. See SPCAI Gives $25,000 to Mission K9, SPCA
Int’l (Nov. 5, 2019), www.spcai.org/news/press/spcai-gives-25000-to-mission-k9 [https://perma.
cc/3ZR6-M9GH]. The SPCAI assists in providing K-9 retirement funds to police foundations
and law enforcement agencies in need. Id. It has worked with the Erie County, New York Sherriff ’s
Office “to establish a K-9 retirement fund,” which “ensures that handlers who want to keep
their retired dogs can afford the medication needed for the dogs to live comfortably . . . .” Tan,
supra note 315.
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for example, helps handlers pay for expenses related to adopting and caring for
retired drug-detection dogs.369 These organizations help ensure that retired drugdetection dogs are not sent to shelters—or worse, put to sleep.370

Conclusion
In 2019, then President Donald Trump described drug-detection dogs as “the
greatest equipment in the world,” explaining that they “do a better job [at locating
drugs] than $400 million worth of equipment.”371 He added separately that
“nothing . . . replaces a good dog.”372 That may be so, but questions persist about
the application of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to drug-detection
dogs in the thirty-seven states—and counting 373—that have legalized marijuana
for recreational or medicinal use.374
For example, lower courts have begun considering whether a dog alert
establishes probable cause to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search” in states that
have legalized recreational or medicinal marijuana.375 In the context of routine
traffic stops, the United States Supreme Court has traditionally held that a dog

How Dogs Protect Our Communities from Criminals and Terrorists, Retired Police Canine
Found., www.policek9help.com/ (last visited July 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/48Q3-859B].
369

See id. (“As a result of the cost and many obstacles that get in the way of adoption, many
retired law enforcement dogs . . . end up in a shelter. Sadly, we’ve heard of cases where these dogs are
even put to sleep because there is no one to care for them.”). Other nonprofit organizations, such
as Mission K9 Rescue, help law enforcement agencies find homes for drug-detection dogs that have
no handler at the time of retirement. See Our Mission, Mission K9 Rescue, missionk9rescue.org/
about-mission-k9-rescue/ (last visited July 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6LC3-YMRY].
370

Betsy Klein, Trump Calls Working Dogs ‘the Greatest Equipment in the World’, CNN Pol.
(Apr. 24, 2019, 3:02 PM), www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/politics/donald-trump-dogs-equipmentopioids/index.html [https://perma.cc/T2LK-FJPY].
371

372
Tal Axelrod, Trump Says There’s Nothing ‘as Good as’ Dogs at Border, The Hill (Mar. 15,
2019, 7:46 PM), thehill.com/homenews/administration/434341-trump-says-theres-nothing-asgood-as-the-dog-at-border-to-prevent [https://perma.cc/X94F-TF63].
373
By 2028, researchers estimate that there is over a seventy percent chance that marijuana
will be legal under federal law. Kyle Jaeger, When Will Marijuana Finally be Legalized Nationwide?
Researchers Have a Forecast, Marijuana Moment (Oct. 24, 2018), www.marijuanamoment.net/
when-will-marijuana-finally-be-legalized-nationwide-researchers-have-a-forecast/ [https://perma.
cc/JB8D-PNG9].
374

See supra notes 209–10.

Compare State v. Senna, 2013 VT 67, ¶ 16, 79 A.3d 45, 51 (Vt. 2013) (“At least in the
absence of any indication that a resident of a home is a registered patient, the fact that Vermont has a
registry of patients who are exempt from prosecution for possession or cultivation of marijuana does
not undermine the significance of the smell of marijuana as an indicator of criminal activity.”), with
People v. Brukner, 43 N.Y.S.3d 851, 857 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 2016) (holding that the odor of marijuana
emanating from an individual alone does not “justify forcibly handcuffing” the individual and
“searching him for marihuana”).
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alert provides probable cause to conduct a warrantless “search” of a vehicle.376 The
Court has reasoned that a dog alert creates “a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found” in the vehicle to be searched.377 Marijuana,
however, is arguably not contraband or evidence of a crime in states that have
legalized the substance for recreational or medicinal use.378
In resolving this question, lower courts could take at least three different
approaches. First, they could hold that a dog alert fails to establish probable cause
to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search.”379 Second, they might determine that
a dog alert is a non-dispositive factor that contributes to the suspicion needed to
establish probable cause to conduct a Fourth Amendment “search.”380 Third, they
could conclude that a dog alert alone provides probable cause to conduct a Fourth
Amendment “search.”381 Determining which of these approaches most closely
aligns with modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a task that remains for
another day—and article.382
For now, three threshold conclusions are clear.383 First, a dog sniff conducted
during a routine traffic stop is a nonbinary type of investigative technique in
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Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013).

377

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

See, e.g., Contraband, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining contraband as
“[g]oods that are unlawful to import, export, produce or possess”; or “[p]roperty whose possession
is unlawful regardless of how it is used”); Adams, supra note 305, at 1194–95 (reasoning that “state
legalization of marijuana” may “take the substance out of the contraband category altogether”).
378

See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 910 (Mass. 2011) (reasoning that the odor
of marijuana alone is insufficient establish probable cause to warrantlessly “search” a vehicle because
the possession of once ounce or less of marijuana is no longer a criminal offense in Massachusetts).
379

380
See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is
incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities
and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”). The Supreme Court has explained “that
‘innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis’” for establishing probable cause to conduct a
Fourth Amendment “search.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (quoting Gates, 462
U.S. at 243 n.13).
381
The Souza court ultimately reached this conclusion. State v. Souza, No. 34154-2-III, 2017
WL 2955534, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. July 11, 2017) (“While we acknowledge that the State trained
Isko to detect miniscule amounts of marijuana before the substance’s legalization, such training
does not disqualify his alert. As the State highlights, marijuana remains illegal for some persons and
under some circumstances.”).

Following this article, the author plans to devote his academic scholarship to the question
of whether a dog alert during a routine traffic stop establishes probable cause to conduct a
Fourth Amendment “search” in states that have legalized recreational or medicinal marijuana, or
decriminalized the substance.
382

383
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The threshold
inquiry in any Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the government’s conduct is included in
the Amendment’s coverage, in other words, whether it amounts to a ‘search’ for constitutional
purposes.”); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
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the thirty-seven states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or medicinal
use.384 Second, a dog sniff conducted during a routine traffic stop is a Fourth
Amendment “search” in those thirty-seven states.385 Third, law enforcement
agencies operating in those states must retrain their drug-detection dogs to be
incapable of revealing the location of marijuana or replace their drug-detection
dogs with those that are incapable of the same.386

Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
Rev. 661, 670 –71 (2005) (“The threshold inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether police
activities constituted a search or seizure. If no search or seizure occurred, the Fourth Amendment
does not apply.” (footnote omitted)).
384

See supra Section III.B.

385

See supra Section III.B.

386

See supra Section IV.A.
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